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Since	  the	  1990s	  a	  debate	  has	  raged	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  historical	  studies	  around	  
the	  concept	  of	  modernity.	  Can	  late	  imperial	  Russia	  and	  the	  USSR	  be	  considered	  modern,	  and	  if	  
so	  in	  what	  sense?	  Particularly	  subject	  to	  controversy	  in	  this	  regard	  has	  been	  the	  place	  of	  the	  
Stalin	  period,	  which	  many	  observers	  are	  reluctant	  to	  label	  modern—either	  because	  they	  argue	  
that	  Stalinism	  resurrected	  archaic	  features	  of	  the	  past	  or	  diverged	  sharply	  from	  much	  of	  the	  
world,	  especially	  in	  the	  realms	  of	  economics	  and	  ideology.	  Others	  object	  to	  calling	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  modern	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  methodological	  or	  political	  grounds,	  given	  a	  range	  of	  thorny	  
dilemmas	  surrounding	  modernity	  theory	  or,	  for	  example,	  the	  use	  of	  “modernization”	  to	  justify	  
the	  human	  costs	  of	  Stalinism.	  If	  one	  can	  recognize	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  Soviet	  modernity,	  what	  does	  
this	  signify—both	  as	  a	  theoretical	  problem	  and	  a	  research	  agenda?	  	  
I	  proceed	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  debate	  that	  has	  gone	  on	  in	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  years	  
about	  modernity	  in	  the	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  context	  is	  important	  and	  revealing.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  
revolves	  around	  a	  concept,	  modernity,	  that	  has	  long	  been	  fundamental	  in	  all	  the	  human	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  Статья	  подготовлена	  в	  результате	  проведения	  работы	  за	  счет	  субсидии	  на	  государственную	  поддержку	  
ведущих	  университетов	  Российской	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sciences	  and	  that	  remains	  an	  important	  locus	  of	  social	  theory.	  Second,	  it	  provides	  a	  new	  twist	  
on	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  and	  most	  important	  binary	  oppositions	  running	  like	  a	  red	  thread	  through	  
the	  entire	  history	  of	  Russian	  studies:	  between	  particularism	  and	  universalism,	  uniqueness	  and	  
comparability.	  For	  all	  those	  involved	  in	  historical	  studies,	  this	  question	  of	  particularism	  and	  
universalism	  applies	  not	  only	  to	  history	  but	  to	  historiography.	  	  It	  applies	  not	  just	  to	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  world	  we	  study	  but	  to	  the	  very	  conceptual	  tools	  and	  methodologies	  we	  employ.	  In	  other	  
words,	  it	  requires	  standing	  back	  from	  narrow	  research	  problems	  and	  relating	  specific	  historical	  
knowledge—which	  historians	  of	  Russia	  derive	  from	  the	  material	  and	  research	  intrinsically	  
derived	  from	  their	  own	  field—to	  a	  tangled	  field	  of	  theory	  that,	  by	  its	  nature,	  has	  international	  
and	  global	  sweep.	  Those	  tools,	  as	  always,	  were	  initially	  developed	  by	  those	  immersed	  in	  other	  
areas—the	  proverbial	  West—and	  can	  only	  with	  modifications	  or	  a	  posteriori	  be	  applied	  to	  “us.”	  
To	  state	  the	  obvious,	  we	  must	  evaluate	  a	  key	  concept,	  modernity	  [модернити]	  that	  in	  the	  
Russian	  language	  was	  never	  used	  as	  such	  by	  the	  historical	  actors	  who	  experienced	  it	  and	  by	  
definition,	  in	  recent	  times,	  could	  not	  have	  emerged	  organically	  from	  Russian	  intellectual	  
milieux.1	  Finally,	  as	  will	  become	  abundantly	  clear	  below,	  the	  debate	  over	  modernity,	  at	  least	  
among	  historians,	  reveals	  deep	  methodological	  splits	  that	  are	  often	  covered	  over	  because	  they	  
are	  not	  addressed	  explicitly	  or	  systematically.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  stances	  that	  scholars	  take	  
on	  modernity	  are	  highly,	  if	  sometimes	  obliquely,	  politicized.	  The	  English-­‐language	  proverb,	  “Tell	  
me	  who	  your	  friends	  are	  and	  I	  will	  tell	  you	  who	  you	  are,”	  can	  in	  Russian	  studies	  justly	  be	  
rephrased:	  “Tell	  me	  what	  you	  think	  about	  modernity	  and	  I	  will	  tell	  you	  who	  you	  are.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Oleg	  Kharkhordin,	  “From	  Priests	  to	  Pathfinders:	  The	  Fate	  of	  the	  Humanities	  and	  Social	  Sciences	  in	  Russia	  
after	  World	  War	  II,”	  American	  Historical	  Review	  120,	  4	  (2015):	  1283-­‐1298.	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   In	  the	  discussion	  that	  follows,	  I	  delineate	  and	  distill	  from	  the	  debates	  over	  the	  last	  15	  
years,	  primarily	  in	  the	  English-­‐language	  literature	  written	  mostly	  by	  historians,	  four	  major	  
positions	  on	  Russian-­‐Soviet	  modernity.	  The	  first,	  “no	  modernity,”	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
widespread	  among	  practicing	  historians	  and	  especially	  those	  working	  on	  the	  key	  period	  1850-­‐
1950.	  It	  either	  rejects	  the	  concept	  of	  modernity	  itself	  as	  flawed,	  ignores	  it,	  or	  claims,	  in	  one	  way	  
or	  another,	  that	  Russia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  were	  never	  modern.	  The	  second	  position,	  “shared	  
modernity,”	  was	  assumed	  by	  what	  I	  call	  the	  first	  generation	  of	  modernity	  scholars,	  those	  who	  
initially	  applied	  the	  concept	  of	  modernity	  to	  the	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  context	  from	  roughly	  1995-­‐
2005,	  although	  others	  have	  adopted	  it	  since.	  It	  sees	  modernity	  as	  more	  or	  less	  a	  unified	  
phenomenon,	  and	  therefore	  concentrates	  on	  what	  Russia	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  shared	  with	  
other	  modern	  countries.	  The	  third	  position,	  alternative	  modernity,	  proceeds	  from	  the	  premise	  
that	  paths	  to	  and	  forms	  of	  modernity	  are	  multiple	  and	  not	  by	  definition	  “western.”	  It	  builds	  on	  
the	  work	  of	  the	  late	  sociologist	  S.	  N.	  Eisenstadt	  and	  his	  colleagues	  on	  “multiple	  modernities,”	  
arguing	  that	  Soviet	  communism	  explicitly	  positioned	  itself	  as	  an	  alternative	  modern	  form.2	  A	  
subset	  of	  this	  third	  position,	  what	  I	  will	  term	  “failed	  modernity,”	  emphasizes	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  
Soviet	  alternative	  modernity	  failed	  in	  1991,	  and	  therefore	  revolves	  around	  the	  ways	  it	  did	  not	  
succeed	  or	  compete.	  Finally,	  the	  notion	  of	  “entangled	  modernities”	  also	  assumes	  that	  
modernities	  are	  multiple,	  but	  argues	  that	  those	  modernities	  are	  not	  single,	  unified,	  or	  systemic.	  
Rather,	  it	  pictures	  various	  forms	  of	  modernity	  around	  the	  globe	  as	  built	  out	  of	  many	  
institutional	  spheres	  that	  interact	  across	  national	  borders.3	  If	  the	  many	  elements	  comprising	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  S.	  N.	  Eisenstadt,	  “Multiple	  Modernities,”	  Daedalus	  129,	  1	  (2000):	  1–29.	  
3	  Göran	  Therborn,	  “Entangled	  Modernities,”	  European	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Theory	  6,	  3	  (2003):	  293-­‐305.	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multiple	  modernities	  circulate	  and	  interact	  internationally,	  then	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  for	  example,	  
could	  be	  seen	  as	  participating	  in	  certain	  of	  them	  very	  differently	  than	  in	  others.	  
	   As	  I	  elaborate	  these	  four	  major	  positions,	  I	  attempt	  to	  discuss	  at	  the	  same	  time	  both	  the	  
practitioners	  in	  the	  Russian	  field	  who	  have	  supported	  or	  criticized	  these	  positions	  and	  the	  
theoretical	  interventions	  in	  other	  areas	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  consider.	  My	  attempt	  is	  to	  pinpoint	  
the	  most	  pressing	  problems	  and	  conceptual	  dilemmas	  facing	  each	  of	  the	  four	  positions.	  In	  so	  
doing,	  I	  do	  not	  pretend	  to	  be	  comprehensive,	  but	  to	  pick	  prominent	  and	  illustrative	  examples	  
from	  my	  own	  perspective	  as	  a	  historian.	  It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  by	  clarifying	  some	  of	  the	  major	  the	  
issues	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  long-­‐running	  if	  often	  fragmented	  and	  implicit	  debate	  about	  Russian-­‐Soviet	  
modernity	  among	  historians	  and	  sociologists,	  my	  discussion	  will	  become	  relevant	  across	  
disciplinary	  boundaries.	  Finally,	  while	  I	  strive	  for	  objectivity	  in	  laying	  out	  the	  positions	  and	  the	  
conceptual	  dilemmas	  facing	  all	  of	  them,	  I	  also	  make	  no	  attempt	  to	  conceal	  my	  own	  views.	  I	  find	  
the	  first	  two	  positions—rejecting	  the	  existence	  or	  the	  concept	  of	  modernity	  or	  conceiving	  it	  as	  
an	  essentially	  unified	  and	  universalistic	  phenomenon—simplistic	  and	  untenable.	  In	  my	  view,	  
the	  way	  forward	  for	  productive	  advances	  lies	  in	  researching,	  testing,	  and	  refining	  in	  the	  
Russian-­‐Soviet	  context	  a	  synthesis	  of	  the	  last	  two	  areas,	  multiple	  and	  entangled	  modernities.	  
	   Any	  consideration	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  positions	  on	  modernity	  in	  recent	  debates	  must	  
begin	  by	  understanding	  the	  turn	  from	  “modernization”	  to	  “modernity”	  that	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  
last	  half-­‐century—outside	  but	  also	  within	  the	  Russian	  field.	  In	  the	  heyday	  of	  modernization	  
theory	  beginning	  in	  the	  1950s–1960s	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  historians	  of	  Russia	  as	  well	  as	  
political	  scientists	  looked	  to	  global	  and	  more	  or	  less	  measurable	  processes	  such	  as	  
industrialization,	  urbanization,	  increasing	  literacy,	  and	  secularization	  as	  a	  means	  of	  putting	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Russia	  into	  comparative	  perspective.	  Although	  the	  modernization	  school	  in	  Russian	  studies	  
became	  more	  sophisticated	  over	  time,	  modernization	  theory	  was	  widely	  criticized	  as	  
teleological.4	  Starting	  in	  the	  1980s,	  debates	  over	  “postmodernism”	  provoked	  new	  
considerations	  of	  the	  modern	  era	  that	  came	  before.	  Understandings	  shifted	  from	  quantitative	  
to	  qualitative,	  from	  processes	  to	  attitudes,	  and	  from	  concrete	  to	  abstract:	  “modernity”	  was	  
linked	  to	  a	  range	  of	  abstract,	  ontological,	  cosmological	  shifts.	  These	  have	  included,	  in	  particular,	  
rebellion	  against	  tradition	  (the	  original	  spirit	  of	  aesthetic	  modernism)	  and,	  perhaps	  most	  
importantly,	  profound	  reorientations	  in	  attitudes	  toward	  time,	  in	  which	  the	  possibility	  of	  this-­‐
worldly	  change	  is	  viewed	  as	  increasingly	  feasible	  and	  fast-­‐paced.	  Other	  key	  processes	  include	  a	  
new	  recognition	  of	  society	  and	  the	  social	  sphere	  as	  objects	  to	  change,	  the	  attendant	  
crystallization	  of	  the	  human	  sciences,	  and	  a	  new	  reflexivity	  and	  awareness	  of	  agency	  to	  
“rationally”	  engineer	  state	  and	  society.	  In	  sum,	  modernity	  has	  meant	  an	  accompanying	  panoply	  
of	  ambitious	  projects	  and	  discourses	  aiming	  to	  shape	  and	  even	  remake	  culture,	  society,	  and	  
man.	  	  
	   Both	  modernization	  and	  modernity	  have	  been	  and	  remain	  deeply	  politicized	  concepts.	  It	  
is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  in	  this	  realm	  the	  connection	  between	  theoretical	  stances	  and	  
politics	  remain	  profoundly	  intertwined.	  Within	  the	  field	  of	  political	  science,	  an	  original	  impetus	  
behind	  modernization	  theory	  was	  to	  find	  the	  path	  toward	  a	  liberal-­‐democratic	  end	  point	  for	  the	  
developing	  world.	  The	  scholarly	  paradigm	  was	  launched	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  when,	  some	  
historians	  have	  recently	  argued,	  modernization	  became	  an	  overarching,	  flexible	  ideology	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  David	  Engerman,	  Know	  Your	  Enemy:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  America’s	  Soviet	  Experts	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2009),	  esp.	  chap.	  7.	  For	  a	  major	  study	  in	  this	  area	  by	  a	  leading	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  studies	  
specialist,	  see	  Cyril	  E.	  Black,	  The	  Dynamics	  of	  Modernization:	  A	  Study	  in	  Comparative	  History	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  
and	  Roe,	  1966).	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justifying	  the	  U.S.	  superpower’s	  foreign	  policy.5	  Even	  as	  the	  language	  of	  contemporary	  
scholarship	  has	  shifted	  from	  modernization	  to	  modernity,	  in	  some	  quarters	  there	  remains	  a	  
lingering	  notion,	  in	  Russia	  and	  elsewhere,	  that	  the	  status	  of	  “modern”	  is	  a	  positive	  approbation,	  
to	  be	  accorded	  or	  denied	  according	  to	  one’s	  views.	  	  
By	  contrast,	  a	  negative	  association	  of	  the	  modernity	  concept,	  representing	  a	  very	  
different	  kind	  of	  politicization,	  derives	  from	  the	  direct	  line	  drawn	  in	  much	  cultural	  criticism	  and	  
postmodern	  writing	  between	  Enlightenment	  rationality	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  and	  the	  
totalitarian	  regimes	  of	  the	  twentieth.	  The	  association	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  with	  the	  Soviet	  
project,	  in	  fact,	  became	  widespread	  among	  those	  historians	  and	  scholars	  of	  Russia	  and	  the	  
USSR	  inclined	  to	  see	  the	  USSR	  as	  modern.	  A	  prominent	  example	  of	  this	  was	  Stephen	  Kotkin’s	  
identification	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  its	  utopian	  mentality	  as	  crucial	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  
Stalinism	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  his	  celebrated	  Magnetic	  Mountain:	  Stalinism	  as	  a	  Civilization.6	  	  
Like	  modernity	  itself,	  this	  critique	  tended	  to	  see	  the	  Enlightenment	  as	  a	  single,	  unified	  
phenomenon	  rather	  than	  referring,	  as	  does	  much	  eighteenth-­‐century	  scholarship	  today,	  to	  
multiple	  Enlightenments	  and	  different	  strands	  within	  them.	  In	  direct	  contrast	  to	  this	  strong	  
tendency	  to	  “blame”	  the	  Enlightenment,	  the	  political	  theorist	  Richard	  Shorten	  has	  argued	  that	  
the	  main	  ideological	  roots	  of	  totalitarianism—in	  his	  work,	  these	  are	  the	  “anthropological	  
revolution”	  aimed	  at	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “new	  man,”	  scientism,	  and	  revolutionary	  violence—all	  
derived	  from	  currents	  in	  modern	  thought	  that	  “in	  the	  philosophical	  sense	  are	  antagonistic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War:	  Third	  World	  Interventions	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Our	  Times	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  33,	  397.	  
	  
6	  Stephen	  Kotkin,	  Magnetic	  Mountain:	  Stalinism	  as	  a	  Civilization	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  
1995),	  6–9.	  See	  also:	  David	  L.	  Hoffmann,	  Stalinist	  Values:	  The	  Cultural	  Norms	  of	  Soviet	  Modernity,	  1917–1941	  
[Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2003):	  4,	  7–8,	  16,	  18,	  166,	  187.	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towards	  Enlightenment	  ideas,	  and	  which	  in	  the	  historical	  sense	  were	  formed	  either	  in	  
opposition	  to	  the	  Enlightenment,	  or	  else	  after	  disillusionment	  with	  it	  had	  set	  in.	  Modernism…is	  
both	  a	  ‘counter-­‐’	  and	  ‘post-­‐’	  Enlightenment	  phenomenon,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  corresponding	  period	  of	  
intellectual	  innovation—principally	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century—that	  the	  intellectual	  sources	  of	  
totalitarianism	  must	  be	  located.”7	  	  
To	  continue	  to	  discuss	  the	  contours	  of	  politicization:	  the	  discussion	  of	  modernity	  has	  
also	  become	  linked	  with	  charges	  about	  “Eurocentrism,”	  namely	  the	  tight	  association	  between	  
modernity	  and	  the	  West,	  rather	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  in	  the	  early	  sociological	  literature.	  
The	  conceptual	  antidote	  to	  a	  tight	  identification	  of	  a	  single	  modernity	  with	  the	  West,	  the	  notion	  
of	  multiple	  modernities,	  can	  by	  the	  same	  token	  be	  caught	  up	  with	  politicized	  notions	  of	  special	  
paths	  or	  Sonderwege.	  These	  easily	  acquire	  positive	  or	  negative	  valences	  depending	  on	  political	  
outlook,	  as	  when,	  just	  to	  give	  one	  example,	  valorization	  of	  a	  specifically	  French	  version	  of	  
modernity	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  Americanization.	  This	  has	  obvious	  relevance	  today,	  
when	  popularized	  notions	  of	  an	  osobyi	  put’	  have	  weighty	  associations	  with	  conservative	  
intellectual	  traditions,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “modernizing	  Stalin”	  is	  used	  to	  
justify	  the	  cost	  of	  “excesses,”	  on	  the	  other.8	  
Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  four	  positions	  I	  have	  delineated.	  
No	  Modernity	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  prevalent	  stance	  among	  historians	  of	  Russia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  period	  before	  
1953	  (as	  opposed	  to	  many	  scholars	  working	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  or	  those	  studying	  the	  post-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Richard	  Shorten,	  Modernism	  and	  Totalitarianism:	  Rethinking	  the	  Intellectual	  Sources	  of	  Nazism	  and	  Stalinism,	  
1945	  to	  the	  Present	  (Houndmills,	  Basingstoke,	  UK:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2012),	  3.	  	  
8	  The	  Russian	  edition	  of	  Oleg	  Khlevniuk’s	  recent	  biography	  contains	  a	  section,	  “Mif	  Stalina,”	  not	  in	  the	  English	  
translation,	  that	  directly	  addresses	  myths	  about	  the	  positive,	  modernizing	  nature	  of	  Stalin’s	  rule	  in	  post-­‐Soviet	  
Russia.	  Oleg	  Khlevniuk,	  Stalin:	  Zhizn’	  odnogo	  vozhdia	  (Moscow:	  Izdatel’stvo	  AST,	  2015):	  443-­‐52.	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Stalin	  period)	  is	  actually	  not	  openly	  to	  dispute	  that	  Russia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  became	  in	  some	  
sense	  modern,	  but	  rather	  to	  avoid	  the	  concept	  of	  modernity	  and	  sidestep	  explicit	  engagement	  
with	  it.	  One	  major	  reason	  for	  this	  response	  is	  the	  sheer	  amorphousness	  and	  definitional	  fluidity	  
of	  the	  concept.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  scholar	  in	  the	  Russian/Soviet	  field	  to	  emphasize	  
the	  definitional	  problems	  has	  been	  the	  political	  scientist	  and	  historian	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny.	  In	  
2007,	  for	  example,	  he	  wrote	  that	  modernity	  is	  an	  “extraordinarily	  capacious	  term,	  which	  
appears	  to	  explain	  everything	  from	  human	  rights	  to	  the	  Holocaust.”	  The	  concept	  has	  been	  so	  
expansive,	  he	  warned,	  that	  unless	  particular	  elements	  are	  specified	  and	  the	  causal	  links	  
demonstrated	  it	  may	  “obscure	  more	  than	  it	  illuminates.”9	  Another	  reason	  for	  Suny’s	  wariness	  
about	  the	  literature	  on	  Soviet	  modernity	  was	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  the	  
Enlightenment	  in	  the	  initial	  post-­‐Soviet	  scholarship	  on	  modernity	  starting	  in	  the	  1990s,	  which	  
seemed	  to	  him	  to	  have	  politically	  conservative	  implications.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Suny’s	  position	  has	  
remained	  constant	  even	  as	  the	  link	  between	  the	  eighteenth	  and	  the	  twentieth	  centuries,	  
between	  Enlightenment	  rationality	  and	  totalitarian	  politics,	  has	  distinctly	  faded	  in	  recent	  years	  
as	  the	  broader	  discussion	  has	  moved	  toward	  multiple,	  non-­‐western	  forms	  of	  modernity.	  In	  the	  
quotation	  above,	  however,	  Suny	  is	  making	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  very	  valid	  methodological	  
objection,	  contesting	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  scholars	  in	  trying	  to	  explain	  historical	  development	  
have	  relied	  on	  modernity	  as	  a	  crutch.	  He	  shrewdly	  noted	  that	  an	  attempt	  to	  use	  modernity	  as	  
an	  “explanation	  for	  action,”	  or	  a	  causal	  factor	  in	  historical	  development,	  was	  a	  problematic	  
feature	  of	  those	  using	  the	  modernity	  concept	  in	  historical	  scholarship	  in	  Soviet	  studies.	  Rather	  
than	  relying	  on	  modernity	  itself	  to	  explain	  the	  course	  of	  events	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  entire	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny,	  “On	  Ideology,	  Subjectivity,	  and	  Modernity:	  Disparate	  Thoughts	  about	  Doing	  Soviet	  
History,”	  Russian	  History/Histoire	  russe	  34,	  nos.	  1–4	  (2007):	  1–9.	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Soviet	  system,	  Suny	  offers,	  modernity	  is	  better	  seen	  as	  “a	  context,	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  
certain	  ideas,	  aspirations,	  and	  practices	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  find	  support	  than	  others.”10	  Thus	  
Suny	  does	  so	  much	  repudiate	  the	  concept	  of	  modernity	  entirely	  as	  to	  issue	  valid	  warnings	  
about	  making	  modernity	  itself	  into	  a	  causal	  factor	  in	  Soviet	  history.	  
When	  Suny	  and	  others	  object	  to	  investigating	  modernity	  in	  the	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  
context	  because	  of	  the	  vexed	  slipperiness	  of	  the	  term,	  however,	  they	  are	  on	  less	  firm	  ground.	  
Our	  scholarly	  toolkit	  includes	  dozens	  of	  key	  concepts—“traditional”	  and	  tradition,	  for	  one,	  not	  
to	  mention	  empire,	  class,	  nation,	  nationalism,	  socialism,	  fascism,	  totalitarianism,	  
intelligentsia—that	  also	  have	  intricate	  debates	  and	  literatures	  standing	  behind	  them.	  In	  fact,	  
what	  key	  concept	  does	  not?	  If	  it	  modernity	  is	  not	  a	  condition	  defined	  by	  “objective”	  markers	  (as	  
in	  much	  of	  the	  older	  modernization	  literature),	  but	  rather	  a	  Grundbegriff	  in	  all	  the	  human	  
sciences	  and,	  therefore,	  a	  heuristic	  prism	  for	  historical	  interpretation,	  then	  one	  must	  indeed	  
clarify	  how	  one	  approaches	  it—as	  with	  any	  such	  key	  concept.	  	  	  	  
	   Yet	  the	  problem	  goes	  deeper	  than	  Suny’s	  capaciousness.	  It	  has	  to	  do	  with	  a	  fact	  that	  
Russian/Soviet	  studies	  confronts	  in	  other	  contexts	  as	  well:	  the	  very	  theoretical	  tools	  in	  the	  
human	  sciences	  that	  we	  must	  use	  are	  developed	  in,	  for	  lack	  of	  a	  better	  word,	  “western”	  
contexts.	  The	  social	  theorists	  or	  theoretical	  sociologists	  who	  launched	  modernity	  theory	  started	  
with	  the	  locus	  classicus	  of	  modernity,	  western	  Europe.	  Anthony	  Giddens’s	  seminal	  lectures	  on	  
modernity	  that	  deeply	  shaped	  subsequent	  thinking	  on	  the	  topic,	  for	  example,	  treated	  the	  rise	  
of	  capitalism	  and	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  fundamental	  to	  his	  understanding.	  Indeed,	  Giddens	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Suny,	  “On	  Ideology,	  Subjectivity,	  and	  Modernity,”	  9.	  See	  also	  Ronald	  Grigor	  Suny,	  “Reading	  Russia	  and	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century:	  How	  the	  ‘West’	  Wrote	  Its	  History	  of	  the	  USSR,”	  in	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  
Russia,	  vol.	  3:	  The	  Twentieth	  Century,	  ed.	  Suny	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006):	  5–66,	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unambiguously	  stated	  that	  not	  only	  the	  origins	  but	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  modernity	  were	  Western.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  globalization	  of	  the	  modern	  ensured	  that	  it	  would	  be—he	  did	  not	  specify	  
when—approached	  by	  strategies	  and	  conceptions	  developed	  in	  non-­‐Western	  settings.	  Without	  
discussing	  how	  Stalinism	  could	  be	  modern	  without	  capitalism	  or	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  Giddens	  also	  
suggested	  that	  the	  Soviet	  case	  suggested	  how	  “totalitarian	  possibilities	  are	  contained	  within	  
the	  institutional	  parameters	  of	  modernity	  rather	  than	  being	  foreclosed	  by	  them.”11	  In	  the	  
Russian	  or	  Soviet	  version	  of	  modernity	  (or,	  as	  some	  would	  have	  it,	  non-­‐modernity)	  we	  are	  
dealing	  with	  continental	  empires,	  not	  nation-­‐states;	  liberalism	  that	  was	  either	  not	  dominant	  or	  
repressed,	  rather	  than	  “really	  existing”;	  and,	  inter	  alia,	  a	  “planned”	  economy	  of	  shortages	  
where	  distribution	  and	  consumption	  differed	  radically	  from	  modern	  market	  economies.	  	  
	   Starting	  in	  the	  1990s,	  a	  group	  of	  historians	  writing	  about	  the	  interwar	  Soviet	  Union	  
advanced	  the	  concept	  of	  “neo-­‐traditionalism”	  as	  a	  direct	  rebuttal	  of	  the	  modernity	  thesis.	  In	  a	  
1999	  edited	  volume	  on	  the	  new	  developments	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Stalinism,	  Sheila	  Fitzpatrick	  
placed	  disagreements	  between	  a	  modernity	  group	  and	  its	  critics	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  new	  
historiography.	  In	  the	  work	  of	  the	  “current	  generation,”	  Fitzpatrick	  wrote,	  “two	  distinct	  
approaches	  can	  be	  discerned.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  ‘modernity’	  group	  .	  .	  .	  suggests	  that	  the	  stereotype	  of	  
modernity	  based	  exclusively	  on	  Western	  experience	  (parliamentary	  democracy,	  market	  
economy)	  is	  inadequate	  and	  points	  to	  the	  Soviet	  example	  as	  an	  important	  alternative	  form.”	  
She	  described	  this	  group’s	  case	  for	  an	  alternative	  Soviet	  modernity	  as	  resting	  on	  the	  presence	  
of	  statist	  phenomena	  such	  as	  planning,	  early	  social	  welfare	  measures,	  scientism,	  surveillance,	  
and	  the	  disciplines	  of	  self	  and	  collective.	  The	  critics,	  adherents	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  neo-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  The	  Consequences	  of	  Modernity	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1990):	  8,	  174–
76.	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traditionalism,	  did	  not	  necessarily	  deny	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  its	  way	  was	  modern,	  but	  “their	  
interest,	  however,	  is	  drawn	  more	  particularly	  to	  the	  ‘archaizing’	  phenomena	  that	  were	  also	  a	  
part	  of	  Stalinism:	  petitioning,	  patron-­‐client	  networks,	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  other	  kinds	  of	  
personalistic	  ties	  like	  blat,	  ascribed	  status	  categories,	  ‘court’	  politics	  in	  the	  Kremlin,	  the	  
mystification	  of	  power	  and	  its	  projection	  through	  display,	  and	  so	  on.”12	  As	  Fitzpatrick	  noted	  in	  
2000,	  a	  number	  of	  works	  by	  on	  “traditional”	  aspects	  of	  the	  Soviet	  order	  lay	  behind	  the	  neo-­‐
traditionalist	  case,	  notably	  Fitzpatrick’s	  own	  emphasis	  on	  patronage	  and	  blat	  in	  Everyday	  
Stalinism	  and	  her	  seminal	  article	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  Soviet-­‐like	  sosloviia,	  “Ascribing	  Class.”	  
Two	  of	  Fitzpatrick’s	  students,	  Matthew	  Lenoe	  and	  Terry	  Martin,	  were	  most	  deeply	  involved	  in	  
advancing	  the	  concept	  of	  neo-­‐traditionalism	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Soviet	  history.13	  	  
	   Tellingly,	  Lenoe’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  modernity	  concept	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  “obscures	  
more	  than	  it	  explains”	  centered	  on	  highlighting	  differences	  between	  the	  Soviet	  order	  and	  
Western	  liberal	  democracies,	  implicitly	  yet	  unselfconsciously	  denying	  the	  possibility	  of	  non-­‐
Western	  modernities.14	  As	  Lenoe	  put	  it:	  “Postmodern	  claims	  for	  the	  dominance	  of	  discourse	  
and	  micro-­‐practices	  of	  power	  over	  the	  self	  and	  the	  world	  have	  contributed	  to	  recent	  arguments	  
that	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Imperial	  Russia,	  and	  the	  liberal	  democracies	  of	  the	  ‘West’	  share	  or	  
shared	  something	  called	  ‘modernity’	  with	  many	  nefarious	  consequences.”	  Those	  who	  used	  the	  
label	  of	  modernity	  across	  the	  boundary	  between	  liberal	  and	  illiberal	  regimes,	  he	  continued,	  in	  
essence	  “argue	  that	  differences	  between	  Leninist	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes	  in	  forms	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Sheila	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Introduction,”	  in	  Stalinism:	  New	  Directions,	  ed.	  Fitzpatrick	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1999),	  11.	  
13	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Introduction,”	  14	  n.	  29.	  
14	  Matthew	  Lenoe,	  Closer	  to	  the	  Masses:	  Stalinist	  Culture,	  Social	  Revolution,	  and	  Soviet	  Newspapers	  
(Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  5–7,	  247.	  This	  Introduction	  to	  this	  book	  contains	  the	  most	  
extensive	  elaboration	  of	  the	  “neo-­‐traditionalist”	  position	  among	  historians	  of	  the	  USSR.	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property,	  level	  of	  coercion,	  and	  political	  organization	  were	  less	  important	  than	  they	  appear.”15	  
Lenoe’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  modernity	  concept	  in	  the	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  context	  was	  thus	  a	  
reaction	  to	  implied	  comparisons	  between	  liberalism	  and	  communism.	  
	   The	  line	  of	  skeptical	  questioning	  of	  Russian-­‐Soviet	  modernity	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  
persistence	  of	  “tradition”	  and	  persistence	  and	  extent	  of	  personalistic	  ties	  is	  now	  represented	  in	  
a	  significant	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  began	  with	  the	  “neo-­‐traditionalist”	  school	  and	  continues	  to	  
multiply	  today.	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  want	  to	  point	  out	  one	  key	  development.	  	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  
neo-­‐traditional	  critique	  of	  modernity	  scholarship,	  as	  we	  saw	  above,	  Sheila	  Fitzpatrick	  referred	  
to	  “‘archaizing’	  phenomena”	  that	  were	  also	  a	  part	  of	  Stalinism.	  The	  term	  archaizing	  means	  both	  
to	  make	  archaic	  and	  to	  evoke	  archaic	  phenomena.	  Fitzpatrick	  chose	  that	  term	  with	  care.	  It	  fits	  
in	  with	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  “neo-­‐traditionalism”	  that	  understand	  that	  the	  resurrection	  or	  
persistence	  of	  elements	  of	  tradition	  could	  be	  or	  were	  combined	  with	  modern	  methods	  and	  
phenomena.16	  It	  could	  also	  fit	  in	  with	  David	  Brandenberger’s	  argument	  that	  the	  late	  1930s	  
“rehabilitation”	  of	  the	  past	  originated	  as	  a	  utilitarian	  party	  strategy,	  or	  the	  presence	  of	  what	  
Eric	  Hobsbawm	  first	  called	  “invented	  traditions.”17	  It	  also	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  comparative	  
observation	  that	  many	  interwar	  states	  made	  appeals	  to	  tradition	  using	  modern	  methods.	  	  
However,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  J.	  Arch	  Getty’s	  2014	  Practicing	  Stalinism:	  Bolsheviks,	  Boyars,	  
and	  the	  Persistence	  of	  Tradition,	  archaizing	  had	  become	  “archaic.”	  In	  Getty’s	  work,	  what	  he	  
repeatedly	  identifies	  as	  “ancient	  and	  archaic”	  practices	  of	  patrimonial	  politics	  persisted	  at	  least	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Lenoe,	  Closer	  to	  the	  Masses,	  4–5.	  	  
16	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Introduction,”	  11.	  
17	  	  David	  Brandenberger,	  National	  Bolshevism:	  Stalinist	  Mass	  Culture	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  Modern	  Russian	  
National	  Identity,	  1931-­‐1956	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  Eric	  Hobsbawm,	  “Introduction:	  
Inventing	  Traditions,”	  in	  The	  Invention	  of	  Tradition,	  ed.	  Hobsbawm	  and	  Terence	  Ranger	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1983):	  1-­‐14.	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from	  the	  time	  of	  Muscovy,	  although	  there	  are	  also	  references	  to	  the	  “millennium”	  since	  the	  
founding	  of	  Rus’.	  Having	  entered	  into	  the	  deep	  structures	  of	  Russian	  “political	  culture,”	  they	  
carried	  over	  after	  1917.	  In	  other	  words,	  Getty	  depicts	  a	  thousand-­‐year-­‐old	  political	  culture	  that	  
drove	  the	  practices	  of	  boyars	  and	  commissars	  alike.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  
history	  form	  part	  of	  a	  single	  stream,	  and	  events	  from	  Russia’s	  distant	  past	  are	  pictured	  as	  
directly	  analogous	  to	  those	  both	  of	  the	  Soviet	  period	  and	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  present.	  In	  its	  
introduction,	  Getty’s	  work	  appears	  to	  align	  itself	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  neo-­‐traditionalism,	  which	  is	  
discussed	  approvingly.	  But	  in	  its	  more	  fundamental	  thrust,	  this	  work	  advances	  a	  qualitatively	  
more	  direct	  continuity	  thesis	  between	  what	  is	  consistently	  called	  “old	  Russia”	  (everything	  
before	  1917,	  with	  an	  almost	  exclusive	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Muscovite	  period)	  and	  Soviet/post-­‐
Soviet	  practices.	  Thus	  the	  Bolsheviks,	  whatever	  their	  agenda	  or	  ideology,	  fell	  back	  willy-­‐nilly	  on	  
the	  “ancient”	  and	  “archaic”	  practices	  of	  patrimonialism	  that	  were	  built	  into	  old	  Russian	  political	  
culture.18	  While	  the	  neo-­‐traditionalists	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  gave	  short	  shrift	  to	  actually	  examining	  
tradition,	  Getty	  picks	  up	  where	  they	  left	  off	  and	  devotes	  his	  attention	  to	  filling	  in	  the	  gap—
reading	  all	  of	  Russian	  history	  backwards	  and	  forwards	  from	  the	  Stalin	  period.	  
Getty’s	  work	  frequently	  cites	  one	  of	  the	  most	  celebrated	  continuity	  theses	  in	  the	  
Russian	  field,	  Edward	  Keenan’s	  famous	  article,	  “Muscovite	  Political	  Folkways.”19	  It	  is	  from	  
Keenan	  that	  he	  adopts	  the	  notion	  of	  political	  culture—a	  notion	  that	  originated	  in	  the	  1960s	  
political	  science	  literature	  concerned	  with	  finding	  the	  traits	  of	  “civic	  culture”	  in	  democratic	  
political	  systems,	  and	  was	  thus	  closely	  related	  to	  modernization	  theory.	  Political	  culture	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  J.	  Arch	  Getty,	  Practicing	  Stalinism:	  Bolsheviks,	  Boyars,	  and	  the	  Persistence	  of	  Tradition	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  
University	  Press,	  2013);	  these	  two	  terms	  appear	  esp.	  on	  2,	  3,	  8,	  9,	  11,	  18,	  33,	  44,	  68,	  69,	  70,	  72,	  75,	  79,	  86,	  279.	  	  	  
19	  Edward	  Keenan,	  “Muscovite	  Political	  Folkways,”	  Russian	  Review	  45,	  2	  (1986):	  115–81.	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later,	  beginning	  in	  the	  1980s,	  transformed	  by	  historians	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  in	  particular,	  
and	  cultural	  historians,	  more	  generally,	  to	  describe	  the	  symbolic	  and	  ritualized	  dimensions	  of	  
politics	  as	  it	  was	  intertwined	  with	  cultural	  production,	  including	  festivals,	  ceremonies	  and	  
revolutionary	  art.	  But	  Getty,	  deriving	  his	  notion	  of	  political	  culture	  from	  Keenan’s	  older	  
approach,	  has	  in	  mind	  tacit,	  underlying,	  and	  most	  often	  concealed	  approaches	  to	  politics	  rather	  
than	  cultural	  phenomena	  that	  can	  actually	  be	  traced	  concretely	  over	  great	  historical	  breaks.	  In	  
this	  way,	  political	  culture,	  specifically	  Russian	  political	  culture,	  has	  been	  essentialized.20	  	  
Keenan	  and	  other	  continuity	  theories	  have	  often	  been	  critiqued	  for	  their	  inability	  to	  
point	  to	  concrete,	  causal	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  features	  of	  Muscovy	  were	  recapitulated	  in	  the	  
Soviet	  period.	  Getty	  perpetuates	  this	  problem,	  largely	  glossing	  over	  the	  changes	  of	  the	  imperial	  
period	  from	  Peter	  the	  Great	  to	  1917,	  during	  which,	  he	  maintains,	  “little	  changed.”21	  Both	  1917	  
and	  1937	  also	  changed	  little:	  “There	  had	  never	  been	  any	  other	  way	  to	  govern	  Russia,	  and	  upon	  
reflection	  it	  would	  have	  been	  surprising	  indeed	  if	  Stalin	  could	  have	  replaced	  a	  thousand	  years	  of	  
governing	  practice	  just	  by	  killing	  the	  current	  incumbents.	  .	  .	  .	  That	  was	  how	  Russia	  had	  always	  
been	  governed.”22	  
Getty	  seems	  exemplary	  among	  those	  who	  see	  “no	  modernity”	  in	  Russia	  in	  that	  he	  
conceives	  simple,	  binary	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  modern	  and	  the	  traditional.	  Either	  a	  country	  is	  
modern,	  or	  it	  is	  not.	  This	  black-­‐and-­‐white	  division	  is	  based	  on	  a	  reading	  of	  Weber’s	  ideal	  types,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  But	  the	  dangers	  of	  reductionism	  in	  “cultural”	  analysis	  	  is	  clearly	  articulated	  in	  Laura	  Engelstein,	  “Culture,	  
Culture,	  Everywhere:	  Interpretations	  of	  Modern	  Russia,	  Across	  the	  1991	  Divide,”	  Kritika	  2,	  2	  (Spring	  2001):	  363-­‐93.	  
21	  Getty,	  Practicing	  Stalinism,	  91.	  Earlier,	  in	  a	  response	  to	  Keenan’s	  “Muscovite	  Political	  Folkways,”	  Richard	  
Wortman	  highlighted	  two	  problems:	  Keenan’s	  already	  outdated	  understanding	  of	  “political	  culture,”	  and	  the	  
problems	  of	  glossing	  over	  the	  many	  changes	  of	  the	  imperial	  period	  (“‘Muscovite	  Political	  Folkways’	  and	  the	  
Problem	  of	  Russian	  Political	  Culture,”	  Russian	  Review	  46,	  2	  [1987]:	  191–97).	  Three	  decades	  later,	  Getty	  
recapitulates	  both	  problems.	  For	  my	  own	  review	  of	  Getty,	  see	  Slavic	  Review	  73,	  3	  (2014):	  635–38.	  
22	  Getty,	  Practicing	  Stalinism,	  267,	  268.	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astonishing	  in	  its	  literal-­‐mindedness,	  as	  if	  everything	  modern	  in	  governance	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  
“rational-­‐bureaucratic”	  and	  as	  if	  everything	  before	  that	  was	  personalistic,	  traditional,	  and	  
patrimonial.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Getty’s	  continuity	  theory,	  archaic	  deep	  structures	  have	  turned	  into	  
the	  most	  important	  causal	  explanation—precisely	  what	  Suny	  was	  warning	  against	  in	  the	  
historical	  scholarship	  on	  Russian	  modernity.	  To	  ascribe	  stasis	  to	  archaic	  deep	  structures,	  to	  
appropriate	  Suny’s	  phrase,	  may	  obscure	  more	  than	  it	  reveals.	  There	  is	  a	  big	  difference	  between	  
archaizing	  and	  archaic.	  	  
Indeed,	  this	  black-­‐and-­‐white,	  either-­‐or	  approach	  to	  modernity	  can	  be	  called	  the	  major	  
weakness	  of	  the	  “no	  modernity”	  literature.	  First,	  it	  assumes	  that	  modernity	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  
either	  present	  and	  achieved,	  or	  it	  was	  not.	  However,	  every	  country	  in	  the	  world	  has	  retained	  
some	  elements	  of	  “tradition”	  and	  invoked	  it	  even	  as	  the	  most	  modern	  breaks	  with	  the	  past	  
have	  occurred.	  In	  his	  classic	  1981	  work,	  Arno	  Mayer	  wrote	  about	  the	  “persistence	  of	  the	  old	  
regime”	  in	  pre-­‐1914	  Europe.23	  “Tradition”	  itself	  is	  flexible	  and	  reinvented,	  as	  many	  have	  
pointed	  out,	  and	  is	  intertwined	  in	  complex	  ways	  with	  modern	  projects.	  Yet	  these	  objections	  
only	  scratch	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  problem.	  One	  major	  issue	  never	  confronted	  by	  the	  “no	  
modernity”	  school	  is	  that	  many	  of	  the	  most	  quintessentially	  modern	  projects	  are	  directed	  
against	  the	  ills	  of	  the	  modern	  condition	  or,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Marshall	  Berman,	  hope	  “to	  heal	  the	  
wounds	  of	  modernity	  through	  a	  fuller	  or	  deeper	  modernity.”	  To	  be	  fully	  modern,	  in	  the	  words	  
of	  Berman’s	  aphorism,	  is	  to	  be	  antimodern.24	  In	  his	  essay,	  “Modernity	  on	  Endless	  Trial,”	  Leszek	  
Kołakowski	  pointed	  to	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  historical	  phenomena	  express	  both	  modernity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Arno	  Mayer,	  The	  Persistence	  of	  the	  Old	  Regime:	  Europe	  to	  the	  Great	  War	  (New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  
1981).	  
24	  Marshall	  Berman,	  All	  That	  Is	  Solid	  Melts	  into	  Air:	  The	  Experience	  of	  Modernity	  (New	  York:	  Penguin,	  1988),	  98,	  
14.	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and	  “the	  antimodern	  resistance.”	  Marxism,	  he	  wrote	  in	  a	  comment	  with	  relevance	  for	  the	  
Soviet	  case,	  combined	  enthusiasm	  for	  rationalism	  and	  technology	  with	  “yearning	  after	  the	  
archaic	  community”	  in	  which	  “both	  sets	  of	  values	  would	  be	  implemented	  and	  make	  a	  
harmonious	  alloy:	  modern	  factory	  and	  the	  Athenian	  agora	  would	  somehow	  merge	  into	  one.”25	  
A	  much	  different	  approach	  to	  the	  “either-­‐or”	  position	  is	  to	  conceive	  of	  modernity	  as	  
incomplete,	  proceeding	  in	  stages,	  punctuated	  by	  crises,	  in	  certain	  ways	  always	  fused	  with	  
elements	  from	  the	  past,	  and	  proceeding	  at	  different	  paces	  in	  different	  areas.	  	  
	   Those	  rejecting	  modernity	  because	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  traditional	  forms	  in	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  Russian-­‐Soviet	  context	  thus	  come	  very	  close	  to	  recapitulating	  the	  hoary	  
stress	  on	  backwardness	  in	  explaining	  Russian	  history.	  They	  also	  engage	  a	  concept—tradition—
that	  is	  no	  less	  amorphous	  than	  modernity.26	  The	  notion	  of	  traditional	  society	  as	  a	  single,	  catch-­‐
all	  category	  encompassing	  non-­‐modern	  formations	  is	  analogous	  to	  conceptualizing	  a	  single	  
modernity	  that	  Russia	  lacks,	  and	  it	  ignores	  the	  way	  anthropologists	  commonly	  stress	  how	  
tradition	  has	  been	  made	  and	  remade	  over	  the	  cataclysmic	  changes	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.27	  
Another	  major	  avenue	  by	  which	  scholars	  have	  rejected	  modernity—in	  particular	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  Stalinism—has	  been	  to	  point	  to	  specific	  features	  of	  the	  Soviet	  system	  that	  appear	  on	  
the	  face	  of	  it	  to	  be	  distinctly	  non-­‐modern.	  And	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  features	  of	  Stalinism	  that	  have	  
not	  infrequently	  appeared	  as	  a	  prima	  facie	  argument	  about	  the	  atavism	  of	  the	  Soviet	  system,	  
the	  sheer	  extent	  of	  Soviet	  political	  violence	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  GULAG	  have	  loomed	  large.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Leszek	  Kołakowski,	  “Modernity	  on	  Endless	  Trial,”	  in	  Modernity	  on	  Endless	  Trial	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  1990,	  orig.	  1986),	  10.	  
26	  Barbara	  Walker,	  “(Still)	  Searching	  for	  a	  Soviet	  Society:	  Personalized	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Ties	  in	  Recent	  
Soviet	  Historiography,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History	  43,	  4	  (2001):	  631–42,	  quotation	  634.	  
27	  For	  example,	  Bruce	  Grant,	  In	  the	  Soviet	  House	  of	  Culture:	  A	  Century	  of	  Perestroikas	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  1995)	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After	  all,	  under	  Stalin	  a	  significant	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  consisted	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  forced	  
to	  wield	  shovels	  and	  other	  primitive	  tools	  in	  a	  form	  of	  slave	  labor.	  Thus	  Viktor	  Berdinskikh,	  the	  
historian	  of	  the	  Gulag,	  began	  a	  paper	  with	  an	  analogy	  to	  the	  Egyptian	  pyramids.28	  To	  be	  clear,	  
the	  history	  of	  slavery	  is	  a	  relevant	  comparative	  framework	  when	  discussing	  forced	  labor.	  But	  
there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  modern	  slavery,	  and	  levels	  of	  technology	  are	  not	  primarily	  what	  is	  at	  
stake	  in	  describing	  the	  modernity	  of	  political	  violence.	  For	  example,	  Golfo	  Alexopoulos’s	  
forthcoming	  work	  on	  GULAG	  physicians	  underscores	  systematized	  role	  of	  medical	  criteria	  in	  
facilitating	  the	  extent	  and	  exploitation	  of	  human	  bodies,	  something	  that	  differentiated	  Soviet	  
politico-­‐economic	  incarceration	  from	  the	  tsarist	  penal	  system.29	  Second,	  to	  give	  just	  one	  other	  
example,	  Mark	  Levene’s	  work	  on	  comparative	  genocide	  in	  the	  European	  “rimlands”	  from	  1939	  
to	  1953	  notes	  how	  the	  NKVD’s	  efficiency	  and	  organization	  in	  rounding	  up	  entire	  populations	  for	  
deportation	  was	  the	  envy	  of	  its	  SS	  rivals.	  Invoking	  James	  C.	  Scott’s	  notion	  of	  “high	  modernism”	  
denoting	  a	  hyperinterventionist	  social	  engineering	  and	  state	  interventionism	  that	  peaked	  in	  the	  
mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	  Levene	  refers	  to	  the	  NKVD	  as	  the	  “cutting	  edge	  of	  Soviet	  high	  
modernism.”30	  Here	  Michael	  Mann’s	  critique	  of	  Zygmant	  Bauman	  in	  the	  context	  of	  explaining	  
the	  modernity	  of	  the	  Holocaust	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  students	  of	  Stalinism.	  Mann	  
forcefully	  argues	  that	  the	  modern	  element	  in	  Nazism	  and	  the	  Holocaust	  lay	  not	  in	  “industrial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Viktor	  Berdinskikh,	  “ГУЛАГ:	  экономика	  и	  идеология	  подневольного	  труда	  в	  20-­‐м	  веке,”	  paper	  delivered	  at	  
the	  conference	  “The	  Soviet	  Gulag:	  New	  Research	  and	  New	  Interpretations,”	  Georgetown	  University,	  25-­‐27	  April	  
2013.	  
29	  Here	  see	  Golfo	  Alexopoulos,	  Human	  Raw	  Material:	  Health	  and	  Inhumanity	  in	  Stalin’s	  Gulag	  (New	  
Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  forthcoming),	  and	  Alexopoulos,	  “Destructive-­‐Labor	  Camps:	  Rethinking	  Solzhenitsyn’s	  
Play	  on	  Words,”	  forthcoming	  in	  Kritika.	  	  
30	  Mark	  Leven,	  The	  Crisis	  of	  Genocide,	  vol.	  II:	  Annihilation:	  The	  European	  Rimlands	  1939-­‐1953	  (Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  316;	  James	  C.	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State:	  How	  Certain	  Schemes	  to	  Improve	  the	  
Human	  Condition	  Have	  Failed	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1998).	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killing”	  or	  technology	  but	  in	  the	  modern	  mass	  movement,	  with	  its	  “discipline,	  comradeship,	  and	  
careerism”	  reinforced	  by	  a	  shared	  ideology.31	  
Aleksandr	  Etkind,	  in	  a	  hard-­‐hitting	  2005	  critique	  of	  works	  on	  subjectivity	  in	  Soviet	  
studies	  for	  “reproducing	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  power	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  unprecedented	  monologicity,”	  
objected	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  perekovka	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  “new	  people”	  in	  the	  
“corrective-­‐labor	  camps”	  of	  the	  Gulag.	  “Is	  it	  not	  important	  that	  New	  Men	  were	  never	  built	  
there,”	  he	  asked,	  “perhaps	  not	  even	  a	  single	  one?”	  It	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear,	  Etkind	  continued,	  that	  
“the	  Soviet	  regime	  was	  modern.	  Its	  results	  were	  decidedly	  anti-­‐modern.	  Some	  of	  its	  means,	  
such	  as	  tanks,	  were	  modern;	  others,	  such	  as	  drills,	  were	  not.	  Were	  the	  spiritual	  aspirations	  of	  
the	  regime—its	  ideological	  goals,	  educational	  plans,	  ideas	  about	  right	  and	  good—modern?	  
Perhaps	  the	  answer	  should	  be	  mixed	  and	  complex	  but	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  ideological	  ends	  of	  the	  
regime	  demonstrated	  its	  most	  archaic,	  backward-­‐looking	  features.”	  It	  is	  important	  to	  observe	  
that	  in	  this	  revealing	  discussion	  Etkind	  definitively	  and,	  seemingly	  without	  exception,	  identified	  
modernity	  with	  liberalism	  and	  the	  West.	  He	  refered,	  most	  strikingly,	  to	  the	  “modern	  (Western)	  
world,”	  adding	  that	  “Soviet	  subjectivity”	  was	  a	  failed	  project,	  whereas	  “modern	  or	  ‘liberal’	  
subjectivity”	  is	  an	  everyday	  reality.32	  	  
Shared	  Modernity	  
The	  “first	  generation”	  of	  modernity	  scholarship	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  was	  concerned	  
above	  all	  in	  countering	  a	  longstanding	  stress	  in	  the	  field	  on	  relative	  backwardness	  and	  what	  
Russia	  lacked,	  what	  the	  Germans	  call	  Mangelgeschichte.	  As	  a	  number	  of	  historians	  of	  Russia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Michael	  Mann,	  The	  Dark	  Side	  of	  Democracy:	  Explaining	  Ethnic	  Cleansing	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2005),	  278.	  
32	  Alexander	  Etkind,	  “Soviet	  Subjectivity:	  Torture	  for	  the	  Sake	  of	  Salvation?”	  Kritika	  6,	  1	  (2005):	  171–86,	  
quotations	  174,	  177.	  
	   19	  
took	  up	  the	  challenge	  of	  developing	  conceptions	  of	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  modernity,	  they	  were	  
preoccupied	  less	  with	  exploring	  the	  origins	  and	  features	  of	  one	  specific,	  particular	  incarnation	  
of	  modernity	  than	  with	  making	  a	  convincing	  case	  that	  Russia/USSR	  could	  be	  considered	  modern	  
in	  the	  first	  place.	  Given	  this	  imperative,	  it	  was	  logical	  and	  compelling	  that	  the	  centralized,	  
interventionist	  state—something,	  unlike	  developed	  capitalism	  or	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  that	  Russia	  
and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  lack	  but,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  possessed	  in	  spades—dominated	  
scholarly	  attention.	  A	  major	  example	  is	  Peter	  Holquist’s	  celebrated	  examination	  of	  surveillance	  
practices	  across	  the	  boundaries	  of	  1914	  and	  1917,	  where	  modern	  state	  practices	  are	  shown	  as	  
fundamentally	  similar	  both	  as	  they	  exploded	  in	  Russia	  during	  the	  era	  of	  total	  war	  as	  well	  as	  in	  
their	  international	  context.	  While	  state	  practices	  were	  the	  same,	  in	  his	  treatment,	  they	  were	  
directed	  to	  different	  ends	  depending	  on	  the	  ideologies	  behind	  them.33	  	  	  	  
Inspired	  by	  the	  domestication	  of	  Foucault	  in	  the	  historical	  scholarship	  of	  the	  1990s,	  
another	  wave	  of	  scholarship	  on	  power	  and	  knowledge	  focused	  on	  experts	  and	  specialists,	  a	  key	  
area	  in	  which	  Russia	  also	  appeared	  close	  to	  the	  forefront	  rather	  than	  representing	  
backwardness.	  As	  Yanni	  Kotsonis	  put	  it,	  “rather	  than	  measure	  what	  was	  not	  achieved	  and	  
conclude	  that	  Russia	  was	  less	  than	  modern,	  the	  important	  fact	  is	  that	  historical	  actors	  debated	  
within	  the	  terms	  of	  modernity,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  can	  be	  considered	  within	  the	  rubric	  of	  
modernity.”34	  Discussions	  of	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  modernity	  thus	  focused	  first	  and	  foremost	  on	  
elements	  of	  comparability	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  distinguishing	  contours	  of	  a	  late	  imperial	  Russian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Peter	  Holquist,	  “‘Information	  Is	  the	  Alpha	  and	  Omega	  of	  Our	  Work’:	  Bolshevik	  Surveillance	  in	  Its	  Pan-­‐
European	  Context,”	  Journal	  of	  Modern	  History	  69,	  3	  (1997):	  415–50.	  See	  also	  Holquist,	  Making	  War,	  Forging	  
Revolution:	  Russia’s	  Continuum	  of	  Crisis,	  1914–1921	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  
34	  Yanni	  Kotsonis,	  “Introduction:	  A	  Modern	  Paradox—Subject	  and	  Citizen	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐	  and	  Twentieth-­‐
Century	  Russia,”	  in	  Russian	  Modernity:	  Politics,	  Knowledge,	  Practices,	  ed.	  Yanni	  Kotsonis	  and	  David	  L.	  Hoffmann	  
(New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s,	  2000):	  1–16,	  quotation	  3.	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and	  especially	  Soviet	  system	  that	  diverged	  quite	  radically	  from	  other	  modern	  states.	  Making	  
Russian	  and	  Soviet	  particularity	  central	  smacked	  of	  the	  old,	  noncomparative	  stress	  on	  what	  
Russia	  lacked.	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  important	  contributions	  were	  made	  not	  just	  to	  modern	  ideas	  and	  fields	  of	  
knowledge	  but	  in	  works	  devoted	  to	  political	  violence,	  revolutionary	  mass	  politics,	  and	  socio-­‐
ideological	  engineering.	  References	  to	  the	  theorist	  of	  links	  between	  modernity	  and	  the	  
Holocaust,	  Zygmunt	  Bauman,	  and	  the	  theorist	  of	  high	  modern	  states,	  James	  C.	  Scott,	  came	  to	  
populate	  footnotes	  on	  Soviet	  history.35	  In	  his	  famous	  Kritika	  article,	  Stephen	  Kotkin	  went	  one	  
step	  further	  and	  claimed	  that	  an	  excess	  of	  modernist	  implementation—the	  sheer	  extent	  of	  
Soviet	  industrial	  Fordism	  and	  by	  extension	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  Stalin-­‐era	  attempt	  to	  leap	  
beyond	  liberal	  modernity—were	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  party-­‐state	  suppression	  of	  private	  
property	  and	  the	  market.	  Examining	  the	  interwar	  conjuncture	  internationally,	  Soviet	  modernity	  
was	  placed	  into	  the	  context	  of	  the	  triad	  of	  mass	  production,	  mass	  culture,	  and	  mass	  politics.	  
Kotkin	  argued	  that	  in	  some	  respects,	  such	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  industrial	  Fordism	  or	  the	  political	  
mobilization	  of	  mass	  culture,	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  communist-­‐statist	  version	  of	  modernity,	  
facilitated	  by	  the	  elimination	  of	  private	  property,	  was	  able	  to	  go	  further	  than	  its	  rivals.	  36	  In	  
Kotkin’s	  depiction,	  then,	  the	  interwar	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  therefore	  in	  key	  ways	  more	  modern	  
than	  its	  capitalist	  competitors.	  But	  the	  concern	  nonetheless	  was	  with	  a	  single	  kind	  of	  
modernity—the	  one	  marked	  by	  the	  international	  conjuncture	  of	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s—as	  
opposed	  to	  exploring	  particularities	  of	  differing	  historical	  trajectories	  to	  differing	  modernities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  For	  a	  book	  title	  using	  the	  metaphor,	  see	  Amir	  Weiner,	  ed.,	  Landscaping	  the	  Human	  Garden:	  Twentieth-­‐
Century	  Population	  Management	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  	  
36	  Stephen	  Kotkin,	  “Modern	  Times:	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Interwar	  Conjuncture,”	  Kritika	  2,	  1	  (2001):	  111–
64.	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(in	  the	  plural).	  The	  result	  was	  an	  implicit	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  single	  or	  shared	  modernity.	  This	  
was	  a	  move	  from	  “none”	  to	  “one,”	  rather	  than	  to	  “many.”	  
	   A	  new,	  updated	  kind	  of	  shared	  modernity	  thesis	  is	  contained	  in	  Stephen	  Kotkin’s	  recent	  
biography	  of	  Stalin,	  which	  is	  not	  only	  a	  biography	  of	  Stalin	  up	  until	  the	  late	  1920s	  but	  a	  lengthy	  
history	  of	  revolutionary	  Russia	  and	  its	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  Now	  concentrating	  now	  in	  particular	  
on	  economic	  competitiveness	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  late	  imperial	  Russia,	  
Kotkin	  finds	  the	  early	  twentieth-­‐century	  autocracy	  especially	  lacking	  above	  all	  in	  modern	  
political	  mass	  mobilization	  (as	  opposed	  to	  economic	  and	  military	  affairs,	  where	  he	  thinks	  the	  
country	  did	  relatively	  well).	  Tilting	  against	  the	  social	  theorists	  who	  have	  dominated	  the	  
discussion	  of	  modernity,	  Kotkin	  maintains	  that	  becoming	  modern	  was	  not	  a	  mere	  “sociological”	  
transition	  from	  traditional	  society.	  Modernity	  was	  rather	  “a	  geopolitical	  process,	  a	  matter	  of	  
acquiring	  what	  it	  took	  to	  join	  the	  great	  powers,	  or	  fall	  victim	  to	  them.”	  Modernity,	  in	  this	  
reading,	  was	  nothing	  more	  and	  nothing	  less	  than	  acquiring	  those	  “difficult-­‐to-­‐obtain	  attributes”	  
that	  the	  greatest	  powers	  mastered	  in	  an	  international	  contest.37	  	  	  
One	  strength	  of	  Kotkin’s	  geopolitical	  definition	  is	  its	  insistence	  that	  modernity	  evolves	  in	  
an	  international	  system	  in	  distinct	  phases.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  was	  “modern”	  before	  1914	  was	  
obviously	  not	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  interwar	  period	  and	  the	  postwar	  periods.	  However,	  when	  
Kotkin	  insists	  that	  this	  evolution	  proceeded	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  Darwinian	  geopolitical	  
competition,	  my	  response	  is:	  was	  it	  really	  just	  as	  simple	  as	  do	  or	  die?	  How	  do	  states	  actually	  
modernize	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  international	  competition?	  Borrowing	  always	  involves	  
intricate	  processes	  of	  adaptation	  and	  domestication	  of	  what	  is	  borrowed.	  In	  the	  twentieth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Stephen	  Kotkin,	  Stalin,	  vol.	  1:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Power,	  1878-­‐1928	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Press,	  2014),	  63.	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century	  these	  were	  processes	  increasingly	  carried	  out	  not	  just	  by	  politicians	  but	  armies	  of	  
experts,	  scientists,	  and	  even	  cultural	  image-­‐makers.	  How	  should	  we	  factor	  into	  this	  complex	  
process	  of	  circulatory	  geopolitical	  surveillance	  those	  ideologies	  that	  in	  other	  contexts	  Kotkin	  
insists	  were	  decisive?	  In	  many	  countries	  experts	  could	  convert	  from	  one	  political	  ideology	  to	  
another	  in	  part	  because	  those	  ideologies	  sometimes	  shared	  the	  intersecting	  lineages.	  Grappling	  
with	  this	  dimension	  of	  international	  competition,	  I	  would	  argue,	  engages	  not	  geopolitical	  but	  
transnational	  history.	  
	   Anna	  Krylova’s	  recent	  discussion	  of	  Kotkin	  directly	  takes	  aim	  at	  his	  thesis	  in	  “Modern	  
Times”	  that	  the	  Soviet	  version	  of	  modernity	  was	  left	  behind	  internationally	  when	  Stalin	  
reconstructed	  the	  postwar	  economy	  along	  interwar	  lines.	  Krylova	  contends	  that	  with	  this	  
conclusion	  Kotkin	  constructed	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  “stagnation	  narrative,”	  although	  his	  treatment	  of	  
the	  postwar	  period	  was	  focused	  on	  economics	  and	  offered	  more	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  short,	  
suggestive	  conclusion.	  More	  important,	  however,	  is	  that	  Krylova	  contests	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  failed,	  
alternative	  Soviet	  modernity	  by	  sketching	  out	  her	  own	  two-­‐stage	  model	  of	  Soviet	  modernity—
what	  she	  calls	  the	  Bolshevik	  and	  the	  Soviet—with	  the	  1930s	  as	  the	  hinge	  period	  in	  a	  long,	  
uneven	  transition	  from	  the	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  The	  post-­‐Bolshevik	  Soviet	  version	  emerged	  as	  an	  
“urban	  and	  middle-­‐class	  inflected	  socialist	  modernity,”	  marked	  by	  a	  discourse	  on	  
individualization	  that	  diverged	  from	  earlier	  Bolshevik	  collectivism.	  Soviet	  society	  and	  its	  
discourses	  (as	  opposed	  to	  Soviet	  economics)	  evolved	  rather	  than	  fell	  back	  on	  patterns	  from	  the	  
1930s.	  For	  Krylova,	  the	  postwar	  decades	  were	  the	  time	  when	  “the	  modern	  alienated	  and	  self-­‐
focused	  individual,”	  as	  elsewhere,	  became	  a	  “mass	  social	  phenomenon.”	  In	  this	  fashion,	  Krylova	  
argues	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  revolutionary,	  Bolshevik	  alternative	  modernity	  is	  misguided,	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because	  the	  postwar,	  “urban	  and	  middle-­‐class	  inflected”	  Soviet	  modernity	  resembled	  its	  
capitalist	  competitors	  far	  more	  than	  often	  thought.38	  Krylova’s	  new,	  two-­‐stage	  model	  thus	  ends	  
up	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  convergence	  theory	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  variation	  on	  the	  broader	  
stance	  of	  positing	  a	  “shared”	  modernity.	  
Alternative	  Modernity	  
	  “One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  implications	  of	  the	  term	  ‘multiple	  modernities,’”	  wrote	  the	  
sociologist	  S.	  N.	  Eisenstadt	  in	  2000,	  “is	  that	  modernity	  and	  Westernization	  are	  not	  identical;	  
Western	  patterns	  of	  modernity	  are	  not	  the	  only,	  ‘authentic’	  modernities,	  though	  they	  enjoy	  
historical	  precedence.”39	  Eisenstadt	  talked	  of	  a	  “cultural	  program	  of	  modernity”	  that	  flowed	  
from	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  man	  and	  hence	  led	  to	  a	  novel	  cognizance	  
of	  contestation	  in	  the	  core	  ontological	  concepts	  prevalent	  in	  many	  societies	  and	  civilizations—
including	  non-­‐Western	  ones.	  	  	  	  
	   Eisenstadt’s	  concept	  of	  multiple,	  non-­‐Western	  modernities,	  along	  with	  the	  related	  
notion	  of	  an	  “alternative”	  modernities	  that	  has	  resonance	  especially	  in	  the	  Soviet	  field,	  has	  met	  
resistance	  among	  scholars.	  It	  has	  provoked	  a	  number	  of	  noteworthy	  objections.	  In	  particular,	  
Frederick	  Cooper’s	  well-­‐known	  critique	  in	  the	  postcolonial	  and	  non-­‐European	  contexts	  argues	  
that	  “if	  alternative	  modernities	  all	  represent	  alternatives	  to	  a	  European	  modernity,	  then	  one	  
package	  of	  cultural	  traits	  is	  being	  awarded	  a	  European	  pedigree	  while	  other	  packages	  are	  being	  
linked	  across	  time	  to	  a	  people,	  however	  defined,	  as	  in	  Chinese	  or	  Islamic	  modernity.”40	  
However,	  the	  danger	  of	  dividing	  up	  modernities	  into	  European	  and	  non-­‐European	  is	  not,	  in	  fact,	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  Krylova,	  “Soviet	  Modernity:	  Stephen	  Kotkin	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  European	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fatal	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  multiple	  modernities.	  Here	  the	  Russian-­‐Soviet	  case	  is	  especially	  
instructive,	  because	  Russia	  can	  plausibly	  be	  seen	  as	  at	  once	  European	  and	  non-­‐European.	  The	  
logical	  response	  to	  the	  danger	  Cooper	  points	  out	  in	  making	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  European	  
modernity	  and	  all	  alternatives	  is	  to	  agree	  that,	  indeed,	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  fuse	  all	  European	  
historical	  trajectories	  into	  a	  single	  Europe	  separate	  from	  the	  Rest.	  	  
However,	  Cooper’s	  warning	  does	  suggest	  a	  danger	  in	  attributing	  all	  the	  particularities	  of	  
all	  non-­‐Western	  modernities	  to	  cultural	  or	  “civilizational”	  traits,	  rather	  than	  treating	  them	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  specificities	  of	  a	  broader	  historical	  trajectory	  that	  would	  include	  political,	  social,	  and	  
economic	  systems.	  	  For	  example,	  Nazi	  modernity,	  to	  cite	  a	  case	  that	  has	  been	  extensively	  
discussed	  among	  Germanists	  since	  the	  1980s,	  and	  more	  recently	  referenced	  by	  many	  Soviet	  
specialists,	  is	  hardly	  separate	  from	  German	  historical	  particularities	  yet	  hardly	  identical	  to	  an	  
undifferentiated	  European	  modernity.	  	  
In	  an	  important	  discussion	  of	  Nazi	  Germany	  that	  preceded	  Eisenstadt’s	  notion	  of	  
multiple	  modernities,	  Peter	  Fritzsche	  used	  the	  term	  “modernism”	  rather	  than	  modernity,	  a	  
common	  practice	  in	  a	  significant	  wing	  of	  scholarship	  that	  is	  favored	  by	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  
combine	  both	  political	  and	  cultural	  phenomena	  in	  the	  same	  concept.41	  Fritzsche	  argued	  that	  
Nazism	  reflected	  an	  “extreme”	  response	  “to	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  crises	  of	  post-­‐World	  
War	  I	  Germany.”	  Calling	  National	  Socialism	  “modernist”	  is	  “compelling	  not	  because	  National	  
Socialism	  bears	  resemblance	  to	  modern	  liberal	  states	  of	  the	  period	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  or	  
because	  it	  adopted	  and	  celebrated	  automobiles,	  airplanes,	  and	  other	  futuristic	  technology,	  but	  
because	  it	  conceived	  of	  Germany	  as	  both	  the	  object	  of	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  forces	  of	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industrialization	  and,	  thanks	  to	  those	  same	  forces,	  as	  a	  potential	  subject	  that	  possessed	  the	  
capacity	  to	  reorganize	  political	  life...The	  Nazis	  were	  modernists	  because	  they	  made	  the	  
acknowledgment	  of	  the	  radical	  instability	  of	  twentieth-­‐century	  life	  the	  premise	  of	  relentless	  
experimentation.”42	  A	  number	  of	  prominent	  scholars	  in	  the	  Soviet	  field,	  reacting	  to	  the	  
discussion	  in	  the	  German	  field	  in	  particular,	  have	  embraced	  the	  concept	  of	  “illiberal	  
modernity,”	  linking	  the	  totalitarian	  interwar	  regimes.43	  	  
This	  concept	  of	  illiberal	  modernity,	  however,	  differs	  in	  important	  ways	  from	  multiple	  
modernities	  in	  that	  it	  is	  based	  not	  on	  plurality	  but	  on	  dualism,	  this	  time	  between	  liberal	  and	  
illiberal	  modernity.	  If	  one	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  have	  been	  many	  differing	  
forms	  of	  modernity—many	  rather	  than	  none,	  one,	  or	  two—then	  it	  follows	  that	  there	  has	  been	  
a	  specific	  historical	  path	  in	  the	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  case	  that	  is	  at	  once	  particular	  and	  connected	  
to	  other	  modern	  forms.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  choice	  between	  particularism	  and	  universalism	  that	  
seemed	  so	  stark	  among	  the	  initial	  debates	  about	  modernity	  in	  the	  Russian	  field	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
false	  dichotomy.	  	  
This	  position,	  rejecting	  a	  binary	  opposition	  between	  uniqueness	  and	  comparability,	  
opens	  up	  a	  number	  of	  perspectives	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Russian	  longue	  durée.	  In	  both	  the	  Russian	  
pre-­‐1917	  and	  Soviet	  contexts,	  one	  needs	  to	  theorize	  a	  modernity	  that	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  
confluence	  and	  interactions	  of	  a	  not	  merely	  modern	  but	  vociferously	  antiliberal,	  antibourgeois,	  
anticapitalist	  revolutionary	  transformation	  and	  a	  society	  that	  had	  not	  fully	  experienced	  
liberalism,	  capitalism,	  or	  the	  bourgeoisie.	  Just	  as	  Russian	  Europeanization	  preceded	  that	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Peter	  Fritzsche,	  “Nazi	  Modern,”	  Modernism/Modernity	  3,	  1	  (1996),	  1.	  
43	  For	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  “illiberal	  modernity,”	  see	  Amir	  Weiner,	  ed.,	  Landscaping	  the	  Human	  
Garden:	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  Population	  Management	  in	  a	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  
University	  Press,	  2003);	  on	  “illiberal,	  socialist	  subjectivity,”	  see	  Jochen	  Hellbeck,	  Revolution	  on	  My	  Mind:	  Writing	  a	  
Diary	  under	  Stalin	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  9.	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most	  of	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world,	  this	  anticipatory	  antibourgeois	  sentiment	  might	  be	  compared	  
to	  similar	  phenomena	  in	  numerous	  non-­‐European	  settings.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  allows	  the	  literature	  
working	  in	  a	  modernity	  framework	  to	  build	  on	  rather	  than	  sidestep	  the	  legacy	  of	  a	  sophisticated	  
historiographical	  tradition	  delineating	  the	  particular	  features	  of	  imperial	  Russia’s	  trajectory	  
within	  a	  broader	  European	  context.	  	  
For	  example,	  in	  a	  classic	  discussion	  rejecting	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  unilinear	  transition	  from	  
traditional	  to	  modern	  in	  the	  imperial	  Russian	  context,	  Alfred	  J.	  Rieber	  turned	  attention	  to	  the	  
“contradictions,	  anomalies,	  archaisms,	  and	  irregularities”	  present	  in	  the	  late	  imperial	  period.	  
The	  term	  he	  invented	  to	  describe	  them	  was	  “the	  sedimentary	  society,”	  in	  which	  “a	  successive	  
series	  of	  social	  forms	  accumulated,	  each	  constituting	  a	  layer	  that	  covered	  all	  or	  most	  of	  society	  
without	  altering	  the	  older	  forms	  lying	  underneath	  the	  surface.”	  Crucially,	  he	  projected	  this	  
model	  forward:	  “In	  Soviet	  as	  in	  autocratic	  Russia	  the	  problem	  was	  how	  to	  instill	  the	  values	  of	  
the	  dominant	  culture—these	  deeper	  layers	  of	  society	  that	  rested	  underneath	  the	  accumulation	  
of	  superficial	  social	  and	  institutional	  forms	  erected	  from	  above.”44	  
Several	  other	  important,	  classic	  conceptualizations	  of	  imperial	  Russian	  historical	  
development	  center	  are	  not	  incompatible	  with	  the	  later	  notion	  of	  multiple	  modernties,	  for	  they	  
also	  center	  around	  this	  late	  and	  rapid	  old	  regime	  modernization,	  its	  paradoxes	  and	  
contradictions,	  and	  the	  time	  lag	  (what	  in	  German	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  Ungleichzeitichkeit)	  
embedded	  in	  Russian	  Europeanization.	  For	  Marc	  Raeff,	  the	  gap	  between	  domesticated	  
European	  practices	  and	  ideas	  and	  the	  distinctively	  Russian	  “socioinstitutional	  matrix”	  for	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  Alfred	  J.	  Rieber,	  “The	  Sedimentary	  Society,”	  in	  Between	  Tsar	  and	  People:	  Educated	  Society	  and	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  Quest	  for	  
Public	  Identity	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modernization	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  his	  landmark	  work	  on	  the	  well-­‐ordered	  police	  state.45	  Martin	  
Malia,	  in	  turn,	  wrote	  about	  an	  East-­‐West	  “cultural	  gradient”	  in	  which,	  for	  example,	  Russia	  
experienced	  the	  equivalent	  of	  1848	  only	  in	  1905.	  Malia’s	  time-­‐lag	  analogies,	  though,	  hid	  a	  more	  
complex	  understanding:	  “The	  political	  formula	  produced	  by	  Russian	  backwardness,	  then,	  is	  the	  
chronic	  compression	  or	  telescoping—and	  thus	  the	  chronic	  radicalization—of	  the	  stages	  of	  the	  
modern	  movement	  toward	  democracy.”	  In	  a	  notable	  formulation,	  Malia	  referred	  to	  the	  “special	  
path	  of	  each	  nation	  along	  the	  East-­‐West	  cultural	  gradient,	  in	  a	  series	  of	  Sonderwege	  from	  the	  
Atlantic	  to	  the	  Urals.”46	  	  Using	  the	  German	  term	  Sonderweg,	  or	  in	  Rusisan	  особый	  путь,	  in	  the	  
plural—Sonderwege,	  or	  особые	  пути—in	  fact	  anticipated	  the	  concept	  of	  multiple	  modernities.	  
	   A	  blistering	  critique	  of	  Eisenstadt’s	  notion	  of	  multiple	  modernities	  was	  advanced	  in	  2013	  
by	  the	  German	  historian	  Stefan	  Plaggenborg.	  After	  finding	  it	  highly	  significant	  that	  sociological	  
modernity	  theory	  is	  largely	  “silent”	  on	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  especially	  Soviet	  communism,	  
Plaggenborg	  nonetheless	  dismisses	  Eisenstadt’s	  theory	  of	  multiple	  modernities	  as	  “trivial”	  and	  
somehow	  “extra-­‐scientific”	  (although,	  in	  fact,	  that	  was	  a	  sociological	  theory	  that	  explicitly	  
labeled	  communism	  as	  a	  modern	  form).	  For	  Plaggenborg,	  the	  theory	  of	  multiple	  modernities	  
has	  no	  core,	  and	  so	  collapses	  under	  the	  weigh	  of	  definitional	  problems.	  Thus,	  at	  one	  point,	  he	  
raises	  the	  rather	  powerful	  objection	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  multiple	  modernities	  demands	  
recognition	  of	  many	  “trees,”	  but	  together	  they	  form	  no	  identifiable	  “forest.”	  This	  comment	  
addresses	  the	  balancing	  act	  between	  the	  global	  and	  the	  national,	  the	  comparative	  and	  the	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  History	  of	  Socialism	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  Russia,	  1917–1991	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  York:	  Free	  Press,	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particular,	  that	  any	  theory	  of	  alternative	  modernities	  must	  undertake.	  It	  is	  entirely	  right	  that	  
the	  notion	  of	  multiple	  modernities	  is	  indeed	  incompatible	  with	  a	  single,	  concrete	  definition	  of	  
the	  modern—that	  is,	  with	  a	  single	  “forest.”	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  plurality	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  provides	  
no	  theoretical	  explanation	  of	  what	  modernity	  signifies.	  Plaggenborg	  offers	  no	  solution	  to	  the	  
problem	  he	  raises.	  Instead,	  he	  resorts	  to	  what	  is	  for	  historians	  a	  rather	  ritualistic	  response:	  a	  
demand	  to	  historicize	  the	  discussion	  of	  modernity.47	  	  
Still,	  Plaggenborg	  identifies	  a	  real	  dilemma.	  If	  all	  particularities	  are	  simply	  held	  to	  be	  part	  
of	  an	  alternative	  form	  of	  modernity,	  we	  are	  simply	  reasoning	  by	  tautology;	  to	  have	  any	  
significance	  for	  an	  “alternative	  modernity,”	  those	  particularities	  must	  also	  be	  part	  of	  something	  
discernably	  modern,	  in	  which	  case	  there	  is,	  at	  a	  given	  historical	  conjuncture,	  some	  core	  or	  
commonality	  to	  what	  is	  held	  to	  be	  modern.	  In	  my	  opinion,	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  objection	  cannot	  
be	  found	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  multiple	  modernities,	  in	  just	  positing	  many	  variations	  of	  the	  modern.	  
A	  set	  of	  potential	  answers	  can	  be	  found,	  however,	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  “entangled	  modernities,”	  
discussed	  below,	  in	  which	  various	  strands	  of	  the	  modern	  are	  understood	  to	  be	  interacting	  
across	  national	  borders,	  both	  Western	  and	  non-­‐Western.	  
	   Similarly,	  another	  criticism	  of	  alternative	  modernities	  voiced	  by	  Cooper	  has	  to	  do	  with	  
the	  distinction	  between	  modernity	  as	  a	  “condition”	  and	  modernity	  as	  “representation.”	  Cooper	  
argues	  that	  scholars	  “should	  not	  try	  for	  a	  slightly	  better	  definition	  so	  that	  they	  can	  talk	  about	  
modernity	  more	  clearly.”	  Instead,	  he	  writes:	  “They	  should	  instead	  listen	  to	  what	  is	  being	  said	  in	  
the	  world.	  If	  modernity	  is	  what	  they	  hear,	  they	  should	  ask	  how	  it	  is	  being	  used	  and	  why;	  
otherwise,	  shoehorning	  a	  political	  discourse	  into	  modern,	  antimodern,	  or	  postmodern	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discourses,	  or	  into	  ‘their’	  modernity	  or	  ‘ours,’	  is	  more	  distorting	  than	  revealing.”	  48	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  
object	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  tracing	  key	  concepts	  historically.	  In	  the	  Russian-­‐Soviet	  case,	  of	  
course,	  there	  was	  really	  no	  exact	  term	  for	  “modern”	  or	  “modernity”	  for	  us	  to	  hear.	  In	  the	  Soviet	  
context,	  “socialism”	  was	  the	  next	  historical	  stage	  and	  what	  was	  meant	  by	  it	  has	  hardly	  escaped	  
attention.	  Sovremennost’	  and	  sovremennyi	  convey	  some	  related	  connotations	  of	  modern,	  and	  
the	  concepts	  of	  backward	  and	  advanced	  were	  prevalent	  as	  well.	  There	  is	  no	  lack	  of	  historical	  
perceptions	  to	  trace.	  But	  even	  if	  the	  history	  of	  key	  concepts	  and	  the	  perceptions	  of	  historical	  
actors	  are	  crucial	  endeavors,	  can	  historians	  ever	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  specific	  vocabulary	  of	  their	  
historical	  subjects?	  
The	  notion	  of	  an	  “alternative”	  Soviet	  modernity,	  which	  is	  often	  raised	  in	  discussions	  by	  
Soviet	  specialists,	  is	  quite	  compatible	  with	  Eisenstadt’s	  theory	  of	  multiple	  modernities.	  It	  holds	  
several	  conceptual	  advantages.	  First,	  it	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  seeing	  both	  elements	  shared	  with	  
other	  countries	  and	  the	  particularities	  of	  a	  distinctive	  historical	  trajectory.	  Second,	  it	  allows	  us	  
to	  look	  at	  elements	  that	  persisted	  across	  boundaries	  like	  1917	  without	  the	  reductionism	  of	  
single-­‐stream	  continuity	  theories.	  Third,	  to	  state	  the	  obvious,	  in	  its	  own	  and	  others’	  perceptions	  
Soviet	  communism	  was	  nothing	  if	  not	  an	  alternative	  challenge	  to	  its	  constituting	  other,	  
capitalism,	  and	  that	  the	  Soviet	  model	  was	  widely	  perceived	  as	  a	  short-­‐cut	  to	  modernization	  that	  
would	  leap	  over	  the	  advanced	  capitalist	  countries.	  
The	  notion	  of	  a	  Soviet	  “failed	  modernity”	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  conceiving	  the	  Soviet	  
system	  as	  an	  alternative	  modern	  form.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  died	  in	  1991	  may	  not	  
have	  loomed	  over	  postwar	  Soviet	  history	  quite	  as	  much	  as	  1917	  long	  loomed	  over	  the	  late	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Cooper,	  “Modernity,”	  114–15.	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imperial	  period,	  yet	  similar	  questions—what	  held	  the	  system	  together	  for	  so	  long	  versus	  how	  
far	  and	  how	  long	  can	  we	  read	  state	  collapse	  backwards—are	  beginning	  to	  be	  asked	  in	  a	  number	  
of	  scholarly	  works.49	  In	  the	  Anglophone	  literature,	  however,	  the	  issue	  of	  Soviet	  modernity	  as	  a	  
conceptual	  problem	  has	  not	  been	  nearly	  as	  important	  in	  studies	  of	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  period	  as	  it	  
has	  been	  for	  the	  period	  before	  1953.	  A	  number	  of	  important	  works	  in	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  period	  do	  
not	  engage	  the	  debate	  over	  Soviet	  modernity	  or	  simply	  take	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
was	  modern—perhaps	  because	  in	  this	  period	  the	  USSR	  was	  an	  industrialized,	  much	  more	  
urbanized,	  nuclear	  superpower	  that	  was	  a	  model	  for	  parts	  of	  the	  developing	  world.50	  Yet	  if	  the	  
rapidly	  expanding	  field	  of	  postwar	  Soviet	  history	  is	  to	  grapple	  in	  a	  serious	  way	  with	  1991,	  these	  
scholars,	  too,	  will	  have	  to	  confront	  this	  question.	  
	   The	  failure	  of	  Soviet	  modernity	  was	  raised	  explicitly	  by	  Kotkin	  in	  his	  “Modern	  Times,”	  
which	  at	  the	  end	  looked	  past	  the	  “interwar	  conjuncture”	  that	  was	  the	  article’s	  main	  focus.	  
Kotkin	  argued	  that	  postwar	  reconstruction	  along	  interwar	  lines	  under	  Stalin	  set	  the	  USSR	  back	  
dramatically,	  since	  postwar	  modernity	  was	  entering	  a	  fundamentally	  new	  phase.	  In	  other	  
words,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  Kotkin	  argued	  explicitly	  that	  in	  the	  international	  context	  modernity	  
has	  differing	  features	  in	  different	  eras,	  and	  Soviet	  economic	  reconstruction	  after	  1945	  in	  
particular	  locked	  the	  country	  into	  an	  interwar	  model.	  In	  another	  work	  on	  consumerism,	  György	  
Péteri,	  explicitly	  refers	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  an	  alternative	  communist	  or	  state-­‐socialist	  modernity	  in	  
both	  the	  Soviet	  and	  East-­‐Central	  European	  context.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Steven	  V.	  Bittner,	  “A	  Negentropic	  Society?	  Wartime	  and	  Postwar	  Soviet	  History,”	  Kritika	  14,	  3	  (2013):	  599–
619.	  
50	  For	  example,	  see	  the	  work	  by	  anthropologist	  Alexei	  Yurchak,	  Everything	  Was	  Forever,	  until	  It	  Was	  No	  More:	  
The	  Last	  Soviet	  Generation	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  Yurchak	  simply	  states:	  “Like	  Western	  
democracy,	  Soviet	  socialism	  was	  part	  of	  modernity”	  (10).	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The	  notion	  that	  consumer	  goods	  would	  underpin	  a	  collectivist,	  cultured,	  and	  socialist	  
lifestyle,	  and	  not	  simply	  in	  aping	  the	  West,	  was	  at	  its	  height	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s	  in	  
both	  the	  USSR	  and	  in	  communist	  East-­‐Central	  Europe.	  Péteri	  focuses	  on	  Khrushchev’s	  attempt	  
to	  make	  automobiles	  part	  of	  socialist	  consumerism	  by	  promoting	  collectivist	  carpools	  over	  
private	  ownership.	  His	  painstaking	  archival	  documentation	  establishes	  that	  this	  became	  an	  
impossible	  project:	  individual	  communist	  party	  functionaries	  in	  Hungary	  quickly	  subverted	  the	  
carpools	  and	  in	  practice	  privateered	  cars	  for	  their	  own	  use,	  thus	  undermining	  the	  collectivist	  
plan	  long	  before	  it	  was	  officially	  repudiated	  during	  the	  Hungarian	  new	  economic	  course.51	  
Péteri	  argues	  more	  broadly	  that	  in	  the	  key	  area	  of	  consumerism,	  the	  nomenklatura	  elite’s	  long-­‐
established	  addiction	  to	  Western	  goods	  and	  luxuries	  had	  widespread	  social	  and	  symbolic	  
significance.	  It	  undermined	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  an	  alternative	  socialist	  modernity,	  thus	  directly	  
setting	  up	  the	  failures	  of	  1989	  and	  1991.	  	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  notion	  of	  failed	  modernity	  is	  clearly	  linked	  to	  communist	  ideology	  and	  
its	  claim	  to	  have	  created	  a	  better	  alternative	  to	  capitalism.	  More	  broadly,	  however,	  the	  notion	  
of	  failed	  modernity	  suggests	  the	  failure	  of	  an	  entire	  system,	  not	  just	  ideology.	  Thus	  the	  question	  
of	  “failed”	  Soviet	  modernity	  must	  directly	  face	  the	  question:	  does	  regime	  change	  mean	  that	  an	  
entire	  system,	  an	  alternative	  modernity,	  failed?	  Or	  could	  it	  be	  that	  other	  strands	  of	  a	  broader	  
Russian-­‐Soviet	  modernity	  that	  straddled	  1917	  also	  survived	  1991?	  In	  this	  regard,	  a	  very	  relevant	  
question	  to	  ask	  (and	  this	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  “none”	  versus	  “shared”	  Soviet	  
modernity):	  is	  modernity	  ever	  fully	  achieved?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  György	  Péteri,	  “Alternative	  Modernity?	  Everyday	  Practices	  of	  Elite	  Mobility	  in	  Communist	  Hungary,	  1956-­‐
1980,”	  chap.	  3	  of	  The	  Socialist	  Car:	  Automobility	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc,	  ed.	  Lewis	  Siegelbaum	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  2011);	  see	  also	  Péteri,	  “Streetcars	  of	  Desire:	  Cars	  and	  Automobilism	  in	  Communist	  Hungary	  
(1958-­‐70),”	  Social	  History	  34,	  1	  (February	  2009):	  1-­‐28.	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The	  political	  scientist	  and	  historian	  of	  the	  human	  sciences,	  Björn	  Wittrock,	  argues	  that	  
the	  reach	  and	  promise	  of	  modernity	  are	  never	  fully	  realized.	  He	  thus	  deployed	  the	  concept	  of	  
“promissory	  notes”	  to	  suggest	  how	  modern	  orders	  need	  to	  revise	  and	  legitimate	  themselves	  as	  
they	  extend	  their	  institutional	  reach.52	  Does	  1991	  not	  then	  mean	  that	  Soviet	  modernity	  was	  not	  
capable	  of	  revising	  itself	  sufficiently	  or	  quickly	  enough,	  rather	  than	  “failing”	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  in	  
every	  way?	  One	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  “entangled	  modernties.”	  
Entangled	  Modernities	  
The	  concept	  of	  entangled	  modernities	  first	  emerged	  in	  postcolonial	  studies	  along	  with	  the	  
desideratum	  that	  imperial	  metropoles	  and	  their	  colonies	  must	  be	  understood	  together.	  But	  it	  
also	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  historical	  scholarship	  on	  French-­‐German	  interactions	  known	  
as	  histoire	  croisée.53	  When	  the	  sociologist	  Göran	  Therborn	  made	  a	  well-­‐known	  intervention	  in	  
2003	  to	  endorse	  and	  develop	  the	  notion	  of	  “entangled	  modernties,”	  he	  expressed	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  Anthony	  Giddens	  “almost	  disarmingly	  candid”	  the	  “Eurocentrism”	  in	  
defining	  modernity	  as	  the	  social	  and	  institutional	  forms	  that	  emerged	  in	  Europe	  after	  the	  
seventeenth	  century.	  “The	  least	  arbitrary	  way”	  to	  approach	  modernity,	  he	  argued,	  “seems	  to	  be	  
to	  consider	  modernity	  as	  a	  culture,	  and	  epoch,	  a	  society,	  a	  social	  sphere	  having	  a	  particular	  time	  
orientation.	  That	  is,	  a	  time	  conception	  looking	  forward	  to	  [a]	  this-­‐worldly	  future,	  open,	  novel,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Björn	  Wittrock,	  “Modernity:	  One,	  None,	  or	  Many?	  European	  Origins	  and	  Modernity	  as	  a	  Global	  Condition,”	  
in	  S.	  N.	  Eisenstadt,	  ed.	  Multiple	  Modernities	  	  (New	  Brunswick:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  2002),	  36.	  
53	  See,	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  for	  example,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  historical	  anthropologist	  Shalini	  Randeria,	  “Entangled	  
Histories	  of	  Uneven	  Modernities:	  Civil	  Society,	  Caste	  Solidarities	  and	  Legal	  Pluralism	  in	  Post-­‐Colonial	  India,”	  in	  
Unraveling	  Ties:	  From	  Social	  Cohesion	  to	  New	  Practices	  of	  Connectedness	  (Frankfurt	  a.M.:	  Campus	  Verlag,	  2002):	  
284-­‐311;	  in	  the	  second	  case,	  Michael	  Werner	  und	  Bénédicte	  Zimmermann,	  “Beyond	  Comparison.	  Histoire	  Croisée	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reachable	  or	  constructable…”	  Modernity,	  it	  follows,	  does	  not	  mark	  any	  one	  specific	  time	  period,	  
but	  can	  be	  incarnated	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  different	  places	  and	  in	  different	  times.	  In	  a	  remark	  
with	  particular	  relevance	  to	  Russia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  he	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  entirely	  possible	  for	  
there	  to	  be	  “different	  periods	  of	  modernity,	  followed	  by	  de-­‐modernization	  or	  re-­‐
traditionalization.”	  Thus,	  modernity	  can	  be	  “entangled”	  with	  elements	  of	  tradition,	  since	  every	  
modern	  rupture	  with	  the	  past	  is	  complex	  and	  incomplete,	  and	  most	  traditions	  evolve.	  In	  turn,	  
this	  implies	  that	  there	  are	  no	  straight	  roads	  to	  modernity	  and	  modernity	  never	  emerges	  
suddenly,	  full-­‐blown;	  instead,	  modernities	  (in	  the	  plural)	  emerge	  as	  they	  evolve	  and	  interact	  
across	  geographical	  borders.	  “Entanglements,”	  he	  writes	  in	  a	  noteworthy	  passage,	  “are	  
produced	  by	  complexities	  or	  partialities	  of	  interaction,	  by	  selective	  reception,	  by	  feedback	  or	  
side-­‐effects.”	  Attempting	  to	  provide	  a	  kind	  of	  global	  map	  of	  the	  programs	  and	  conflicts	  that	  
generated	  various	  modernities,	  Therborn	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  European	  route	  of	  internal	  
conflict	  or	  civil	  war;	  the	  colonial	  world,	  where	  modernity	  arrived	  at	  the	  “barrel	  of	  a	  gun”;	  and	  
the	  trajectory	  of	  several	  pre-­‐modern	  empires,	  including	  China	  and	  Russia,	  which	  embarked	  on	  
what	  he	  calls	  “Reactive	  Modernization”	  when	  they	  were	  challenged	  and	  threatened	  by	  colonial	  
domination.	  Imperial	  Russia,	  in	  his	  view,	  combined	  the	  element	  of	  European	  internal	  “civil	  war”	  
with	  this	  Reactive	  Modernization.54	  In	  this	  picture,	  several	  types	  of	  modernizing	  trajectories	  can	  
be	  “entangled.”	  
The	  sociologist	  Johann	  Arnason,	  one	  of	  the	  original	  proponents	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
“multiple	  modernities,”	  continued	  this	  line	  of	  investigation	  in	  the	  communist	  period,	  writing	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  Therborn,	  “Entangled	  Modernities,”	  294,	  295,	  299,	  301.	  In	  Russian	  and	  Soviet	  studies,	  the	  idea	  of	  
“conservative	  modernization”	  is	  well	  known.	  See,	  for	  example,	  А.	  Г.	  Вишневский,	  Серп и рубль. Консервативная 
модернизация в СССР (Москва:	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about	  “entangled	  communisms”	  in	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Chinese	  cases.	  In	  both	  countries,	  imperial	  
legacies	  and	  imperial	  traditions	  interacted	  with	  modernization	  projects,	  and	  the	  two	  
revolutionary	  projects	  were	  also	  linked	  directly	  to	  one	  another	  after	  1949	  in	  intricate	  if	  
asymmetrical	  ways.	  But	  forced	  modernization	  under	  Stalinism	  linked	  up	  with	  earlier	  tsarist	  
traditions	  of	  top-­‐down	  modernization,	  whereas	  “no	  comparable	  legacy	  was	  available	  in	  China,	  
where	  modernizing	  efforts	  of	  the	  imperial	  centre	  had	  been	  on	  a	  much	  more	  modest	  scale;	  
hence	  the	  Chinese	  adaptation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  model,	  but	  hence	  also	  the	  efforts	  to	  redefine	  it…”55	  
As	  this	  suggests,	  many	  of	  the	  discussions	  of	  “entanglements”	  look	  beyond	  the	  interactions	  
between	  separate	  countries	  and	  national	  groups—which	  can	  be	  conceived	  in	  the	  differing	  
realms	  of	  practices,	  discourses,	  technologies	  and	  material	  culture,	  and	  the	  circulation	  of	  
knowledge.	  They	  also	  conceive	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  traffic	  between	  historical	  legacies	  and	  
global	  or	  international	  processes.	  	  
The	  most	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  entangled	  modernities—as	  opposed	  to	  
the	  previous	  three	  conceptions	  I	  have	  elaborated	  of	  none,	  shared,	  and	  alternative—is	  that	  
modernity	  itself	  is	  not	  taken	  as	  a	  single,	  systemic	  whole.	  Rather,	  as	  entanglements	  are	  
identified,	  modernity	  is	  broken	  up	  into	  its	  component	  elements	  and	  conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
interactions	  of	  those	  elements	  across	  space	  and	  time.	  This	  has	  particular	  relevance	  for	  Russia	  
and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  where	  we	  need	  to	  analyze	  two	  state	  breakdowns	  in	  the	  twentieth	  
century—1917	  and	  1991.	  The	  notion	  of	  failed	  modernity—which	  tends	  to	  picture	  those	  
breakdowns	  in	  terms	  of	  failure	  of	  the	  whole—can	  be	  compared	  to	  a	  more	  differentiated	  picture	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  Johann	  P.	  Arnason,	  “Entangled	  Communisms:	  Imperial	  Revolutions	  in	  Russia	  and	  China,”	  European	  Journal	  of	  
Social	  Theory	  6,	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  (2003):	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of	  differing	  paces	  of	  change	  and	  cross-­‐border	  entanglements	  in,	  for	  example,	  the	  political,	  
social,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  realms.	  
An	  example	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  disaggregation	  inherent	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  “entangled	  
modernities”	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  new	  work	  by	  the	  historian	  Adeeb	  Khalid	  on	  Turkestan	  and	  
Central	  Asia	  in	  the	  decades	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  1917.	  Khalid	  argues	  against	  the	  common	  
conception	  of	  “the	  history	  of	  the	  region	  as	  a	  straightforward	  encounter	  between	  two	  clearly	  
defined,	  distinct,	  and	  homogenous	  entities,	  ‘Central	  Asia’	  and	  the	  ‘Soviet	  regime.’”	  Rather,	  he	  
writes	  the	  history	  of	  Uzbekistan	  as	  the	  story	  of	  “two	  visions	  of	  modernity”	  that	  overlapped	  yet	  
remained	  distinct:	  that	  of	  the	  Bolshevik	  new	  regime,	  and	  that	  of	  those	  members	  of	  the	  
indigenous	  intelligentsia	  known	  as	  Jadids,	  who	  in	  Turkestan	  before	  1917	  articulated	  a	  vision	  of	  
progress	  and	  civilization	  through	  an	  “aggressively	  modernist	  interpretation	  of	  Islam.”	  The	  Jadids	  
embraced	  the	  revolution	  and	  especially	  the	  notion	  of	  cultural	  revolution	  after	  1917,	  as	  they	  
were	  radicalized,	  but	  they	  conceptualized	  it	  entirely	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  nation,	  not	  class.	  In	  
particular,	  while	  the	  Jadids	  shared	  an	  intense	  stress	  on	  enlightening	  the	  masses	  with	  the	  
Russian	  intelligentsia,	  their	  point	  of	  reference	  was	  not	  St.	  Petersburg	  or	  Tehran,	  but	  Istanbul.	  
This	  was	  a	  “fateful”	  entanglement,	  in	  Khalid’s	  discussion,	  for	  a	  fascination	  with	  Turkism	  came	  to	  
the	  fore	  in	  Jadidism	  as	  a	  result.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Jadid	  version	  of	  modernity	  did	  not	  only	  interact	  
with	  the	  European	  communist	  leadership	  in	  the	  region	  and	  the	  Soviet	  center,	  but	  was	  
repeatedly	  shaped	  by	  clashes	  with	  the	  Jadids’	  conservative	  opponents	  within	  Central	  Asian	  and	  
Uzbek	  society.	  Two	  generations	  of	  the	  Uzbek	  intelligentsia,	  first	  the	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  cohort	  
and	  then	  the	  first	  Soviet	  generation,	  perished	  in	  the	  1930s.	  But	  this	  came	  only	  after	  Uzbekistan	  
had	  been	  “made”	  by	  a	  complicated	  interaction	  between	  two	  different	  visions	  of	  modernity	  that	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joined	  forces	  for	  a	  time,	  but	  contained	  distinguishably	  different	  “logics.”56	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  
note	  that	  Khalid	  himself	  never	  once	  uses	  the	  term	  “entangled	  modernities.”	  Yet	  Khalid,	  in	  
essence,	  suggests	  that	  a	  single,	  unified	  Soviet	  modernity	  did	  not	  exist	  within	  the	  Soviet	  
multinational	  state;	  rather,	  in	  the	  case	  he	  elaborates,	  distinct	  yet	  intertwined	  versions	  of	  
modernity	  co-­‐existed	  within	  the	  Soviet	  project.	  Khalid	  also	  insists	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  divided	  and	  
internally	  conflicted	  Central	  Asian	  society	  that	  there	  was	  no	  single	  “tradition”	  that	  interacted	  
with	  a	  single	  Bolshevik	  center;	  instead,	  tradition	  and	  “authenticity”	  were	  contingent	  and	  
constantly	  contested.	  In	  the	  end,	  I	  would	  argue,	  Khalid’s	  implicit	  endorsement	  of	  “entangled	  
modernities”	  without	  the	  term	  itself	  suggests	  that	  history	  and	  theory	  can	  come	  to	  the	  same	  
position	  by	  way	  of	  different	  paths.	  
One	  new	  study	  that	  does	  explicitly	  engage	  the	  theory	  of	  entangled	  modernities	  is	  Alexey	  
Golubev’s	  study	  of	  late	  Soviet	  material	  history,	  which	  focuses	  on	  a	  social	  history	  of	  Soviet	  
material	  objects	  and	  spaces.	  Golubev	  argues	  that	  “many	  phenomena	  in	  late	  socialism	  were	  
inspired,	  triggered,	  or	  caused	  by	  the	  transnational	  circulation	  of	  objects,	  ideas,	  and	  people.”	  To	  
him	  this	  implies	  not	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  a	  quintessentially	  modern	  state,	  nor	  that	  it	  
represented	  a	  separate,	  socialist	  variation	  of	  modernity,	  nor	  that	  it	  was	  never	  modern	  at	  all.	  
Instead,	  he	  argues	  that	  “the	  concept	  of	  entangled	  modernties	  popularized	  by	  Göran	  Therborn	  
is,	  indeed,	  helpful	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  late	  socialist	  society,	  yet	  were	  should	  add	  an	  
important	  aspect	  to	  it:	  the	  divisions	  between	  modernities	  followed	  no	  only	  national	  and	  
cultural,	  but	  also	  social	  borders…different	  social	  groups	  had	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  
meant	  to	  be	  modern.”	  In	  this	  sense,	  Golubev	  argues,	  to	  speak	  of	  an	  alternative	  or	  unique	  form	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  Khalid,	  Making	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of	  modernity	  in	  the	  Soviet	  context	  would	  mean	  to	  “discard	  an	  immense	  diversity	  of	  social	  and	  
cultural	  life	  in	  the	  USSR”	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  political	  system	  and	  the	  state.57	  
As	  Golubev’s	  position	  suggests,	  the	  theory	  of	  entangled	  modernities,	  even	  as	  it	  usefully	  
breaks	  down	  the	  unified	  and	  holistic	  understandings	  of	  modernity	  that	  have	  dominated	  
conceptions	  in	  the	  past,	  tends	  when	  applied	  to	  the	  Soviet	  context	  to	  normalize	  the	  Soviet	  
system.	  His	  work	  does	  this	  by	  showing	  how	  certain	  aspects	  of	  Soviet	  life,	  including	  social	  and	  
cultural	  developments,	  were	  part	  of	  an	  international	  circulation	  or	  diffusion	  of	  modern	  
phenomena	  that	  were	  not	  necessarily	  or	  even	  at	  all	  connected	  directly	  to	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  
state	  or	  the	  ideology.	  The	  notion	  of	  entangled	  modernities	  thus	  avoids	  one	  drawback	  of	  the	  
“failed	  modernity”	  position,	  which	  implicitly	  pictures	  modernity	  as	  a	  systemic	  whole	  that	  either	  
succeeds	  or	  fails	  as	  a	  whole.	  However,	  in	  so	  doing	  it	  opens	  itself	  to	  another	  line	  of	  critique.	  How	  
can	  the	  theory	  of	  entangled	  modernities	  confront	  the	  issue	  that	  communism	  was	  established	  
both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  as	  an	  alternative	  formation	  distinct	  from	  capitalism	  and	  the	  West?	  It	  
was	  understood	  as	  such	  an	  alternative	  by	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  around	  the	  globe,	  and	  
its	  decline	  and	  fall	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  this	  fact.	  Furthermore,	  were	  not	  the	  various	  
dimensions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  system—its	  ideology,	  political	  system,	  economic	  order,	  culture,	  and	  
society—deeply	  and	  profoundly	  intertwined?	  The	  theory	  of	  entangled	  modernities	  threatens	  to	  
disaggregate	  and	  separate	  those	  various	  dimensions	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  fundamental	  
interconnections	  are	  lost.	  
It	  seems	  to	  me,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  way	  forward	  in	  applying	  the	  theory	  of	  modernity	  to	  
the	  Soviet	  context	  lies	  in	  the	  simultaneous	  development	  and	  investigation	  of	  both	  the	  third	  and	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fourth	  positions	  outlined	  in	  this	  article—the	  notions	  of	  alternative	  and	  entangled	  modernities.	  
The	  two	  positions	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  incompatible,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  so.	  The	  
transnational,	  international,	  and	  global	  dimensions	  of	  modernity	  can	  be	  investigated	  even	  as	  it	  
is	  acknowledged	  that	  Soviet	  communism	  was	  a	  deeply	  systemic	  phenomenon	  that	  was	  
understood	  and	  constituted	  as	  a	  path	  of	  development	  that	  would	  leap	  over,	  oppose,	  and	  “bury”	  
the	  modern	  West.	  Once	  again	  the	  binary	  opposition	  between	  particularism	  and	  universalism,	  
uniqueness	  and	  comparability,	  proves	  to	  be	  false.	  If	  in	  the	  Soviet	  case	  modernity	  can	  be	  
conceived	  as	  at	  once	  alternative	  and	  entangled,	  it	  is	  also	  plausible	  that	  other	  modern	  societies	  
can	  also	  be	  conceived	  as	  such	  as	  well.	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